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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, a growing recognition of the costs imposed on the
American economy by unnecessary regulatory programs' has generated
significant deregulation at the federal level. 2 Although there is dispute con-
cerning the proper nature, extent, and focus of the trend toward
deregulation,3 it is reasonable, in the absence of a major political change,
to assume that it will continue. 4 An important question thus becomes whether
federal initiatives will influence states to increase deregulation at their level.
Where past federal regulatory endeavors rest on questionable policy assump-
tions, state legislation based on the same assumptions should also be
vulnerable. Such is the case with motor carrier entry and rate regulation
in the state of Missouri.
The conventional justification for the'creation of federal and state
regulatory agencies is that they are designed to protect the public against
abuses of economic power and market imperfections.P In the motor carrier
sector in Missouri, this goal was expressed in State ex rel. National Trailer Convoy
v. Public Service Commission:
6
The purpose of our public service commission laws is basically to
secure uniformity of operating conditions among similar carriers;
to secure adequate and sustained service for the public at the least
possible cost; to prevent economic waste that follows useless duplica-
1. See generally P. MAGAVOY, THE REGULATED INDUSTRIES AND THE
ECONOMY (1979).
2. In the transportation industry alone, see the Motor Carrier Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 98-296, 94 Stat. 793; the Staggers Rail Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-448,
94 Stat. 1895; the Household Goods Transportation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No.
96-454, 94 Stat. 2011.
3. Although regulatory "capture" and "producer-protection" have gained
currency as models describing the failure of much economic regulation to enhance
consumer welfare, there is a growing body of literature challenging the explanatory
power of these theories for the whole range of government regulation. See generally
Schuck, Book Review, 90 YALE L.J. 702 (1981). Nevertheless, it is the position of
this Article that the consequences of entry and rate regulation in the motor carrier
industry are consistent with what could be expected from a producer-protection
regulatory design. This conclusion does not depend on the validity of any particular
theory of regulation.
4. Although the Reagan Administration has voiced an ideological commit-
ment to the reduction of government intervention in the marketplace, the inten-
sity of this commitment is subject to the vagaries of the political process. See Karr,
New ICC Chairman Reese Taylor Moves to Halt Trucking-Industry Deregulation, Wall St.
J., Aug. 5, 1981, at 1.
5. See generally M. BERNSTEIN, REGULATION OF BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT
COMMISSION (1955). One ofthe more recent defenses of government regulation as
a public good is Gellhorn, Deregulation: Delight or Delusion?, 4 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 469
(1980).
6. 488 S.W.2d 942 (Mo. App., K.C. 1972).
[Vol. 47
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tion of service; and to protect and conserve investments already made
to furnish and maintain such public service. 7
The articulated justifications for Missouri Public Service Commission
(P. S.C.) regulation in general, and motor carrier regulation in particular,
are consistent with the arguments advanced in favor of similar legislation
on the federal level. In the course of accepting these policy assumptions,
Missouri has established a comprehensive legislative framework for the in-
trastate regulation of both common 8 and contract 9 motor carriers.' 0
Several classes of motor carriage are exempt from P. S.C. jurisdiction.
Some of the more important are private carriers, school buses, taxicabs,
various forms of agricultural transport, and transport within or between con-
tiguous municipalities and commercial zones. 1 Non-exempt carriers,
7. Id. at 944-45. In State ex rel. Beaufort Transfer Co. v. Clark, 504 S.W.2d
216, 219 (Mo. App., K.C. 1973), the court characterized the statutory requirement
that other carriers be considered in deciding whether to grant an operating certificate
as announcing "a policy of regulated competition for the public benefit instead of
officially regulated and sanctioned monopoly."
8. Mo. REV. STAT. § 390.020.5 (1978) defines "common carrier" as "any
person which holds itself out to the general public to engage in the transportation
by motor vehicle of passengers or property for hire or compensation upon the public
highways. "
9. Id. § 390.020.6 defines "contract carrier" as "any person which, under
individual contracts or agreements, engages in the transportation ... by motor
vehicle of passengers or property for hire or compensation upon the public
highways. "
10. Seeid. §§ 390.011-.176 for the basic motor carrier regulatory scheme. The
P.S.C. is empowered:
1. To license, supervise and regulate every motor carrier in this state;
to make, fix or approve just and reasonable minimum, maximum, or
minimum and maximum rates, fares and charges thereof; to make, fix or
approve just and reasonable classifications, rules and regulations pertaining
to rates, fares and charges thereof; by general order or otherwise, to
establish reasonable requirements with respect to adequate and continuous
service, uniform systems of accounts, records and reports, preservation
of records, safety of operation and equipment; and to supervise and
regulate motor carriers in these and all other matters affecting their rela-
tionship with the public.
3. To establish just and reasonable classifications of types of carriers
included in the terms "common carriers" or "contract carriers" as the
special nature of the services performed by such carriers shall require; and
by general order or otherwise, establish such just and reasonable rules,
regulations and requirements, consistent with the provisions of sections
390.011 to 390.176, to be observed by carriers so classified or grouped,
as the commission deems necessary or desirable in the public interest.
Id. § 390.041.
11. Id. § 390.030.
3
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however, are subject to a form of economic regulation based on entry and
rate-making controls.
A. Entry Controls
Any non-exempt person or firm who wishes to engage in intrastate
common 2 or contract 3 motor carriage in Missouri must apply for a cer-
tificate of public convenience and necessity from the P.S.C.14 The applica-
tion must be in writing and must include (1) full information concerning
the ownership and financial condition of the applicant, equipment to be used,
and its reasonable value; (2) the complete route or routes over which the
applicant desires to operate, or the territory to be served, and (3) the pro-
posed rates, schedule or schedules, or timetable of the applicant. 15
Upon the filing of the certificate application, the P.S.C. sets a hearing
date and gives notice to any carrier who has applied for a certificate between
any of the applicant's proposed service points16 and to any party who might,
in the P.S.C.'s opinion, be properly interested in or affected by issuance
of the certificate. Most important is the provision that notice of the hearing
must be served on any competing or potentially competing common carrier.
Any such carrier who complies with the P.S.C.'s rules and regulations "is
an interested party to the proceeding and may offer testimony for or against
the granting" ' 7 of a certificate.18
The determination that the public convenience and necessity 9 would
be served by an additional carrier requires that the applicant carry the burden
of "establishing the need for the service sought, that such service is in the
public interest, and will not work an undue hardship or adversely burden
or affect the ability to perform the public service being accomplished by ex-
isting carriers.' '20 This burden "cannot be met by speculation, guesswork,
12. Id. § 390.051.
13. Id. § 390.061.
14. Id. §§ 390.051.1, .061.1.
15. Id. §§ 390.051.2, .061.2.
16. Id. §§ 390.051.3, .061.3.
17. Id. §§ 390.051.4(2), (3); .061.4(2), (3).
18. See also State ex rel. Brink's, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 535 S.W.2d
582, 584-85 (Mo. App., K.C. 1976) (intervention proper even though service pro-
posed by applicant is not same as that rendered by intervenor).
19. In the operating certificate context, the cases hold that the term
"necessity"
does not mean "essential" or "absolutely indispensible;" rather, it re-
quires that the evidence must show that the additional service would be
an improvement justifying its cost and that the inconvenience of the public
occasioned by the lack of a carrier is sufficiently great to amount to a
necessity.
State ex rel. Beaufort Transfer Co. v. Clark, 504 S.W.2d 216, 219 (Mo. App., K.C.
1973).
20. State ex rel. National Trailer Convoy v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 488 S.W.2d
942, 945 (Mo. App., K.C. 1972).
696 [Vol. 47
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hopes or aspirations."
21
Although Missouri Revised Statutes section 390.05122 vests considerable
discretion in the P.S.C. to determine whether new entry should be granted,
that agency is reminded in subsection 6 of that statute to "give reasonable
consideration to the transportation service being furnished by any common
carrier by rail or motor vehicle and the effect which the proposed transportation
service may have upon such carriers. "23
No provision better illustrates the "cartel enforcement"24 function of
the operating certificate requirement. Perhaps the lawmakers of the time,
not confident that the P.S.C. would protect the interests of incumbent cer-
tificate holders, 25 felt it necessary to prevent any accidental forays into
economic decisionmaking that might enhance consumer welfare. 26 If this
21. State ex rel. Oliver v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 542 S.W.2d 595, 598 (Mo.
App., K.C. 1976).
22. (1978).
23. MO. REV. STAT. § 390.051.6 (1978) (emphasis added).
24. "Cartel enforcement" is a term that describes the tendency of regulations
to protect existing businesses while keeping others out of a particular sector. See Part
IV.B. infra.
25. This apparent lack of confidence in the P.S.C.'s willingness to protect firms
with pre-existing operating authority may have been misplaced. David Boies has
pointed out that regulatory agencies come into direct contact only with represen-
tatives of regulated industries and organized consumer groups. This eventually leads
to the belief that the good of the dominant regulated firms is identical with the public
interest. Boies, Experiment in Mercantilism: Minimum Rate Regulation by the Interstate
Commerce Commission, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 601, 610 (1968).
26. In his historical survey of the certificate of public convenience and necessity
in various states, WilliamJones challenges the hypothesis that this device was the
product solely of industry pressures for protection against competition. Rather, cer-
tification "was intended to meet genuine problems perceived by the public as well
as the public service industries." Jones, Origins of the Certificate of Public Convenience
and Necessity: Developments in the States, 1870-1920, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 426, 435
(1979). Jones does not suggest, however, that salutary intent vindicates use of the
certification device in structurally competitive markets:
[I]t is doubtful that the certificate of public convenience and necessity serves
an essential role in markets other than those characterized by natural
monopoly conditions. The considerations involving wasteful duplication
of plant, ineffectiveness of competition, reduction of investment risk, and
minimization of environmental damage appear to be valid for natural
monopolies alone. Where multiple firms can provide economical service,
there is no reason to oppose duplicate facilities or to assume that competi-
tion will be ineffective; investment risks will be greater and environmen-
tal damage must be controlled, but in the absence of natural monopoly
conditions it is difficult to justify special controls for the public service in-
dustries that do not apply to others ....
... In sum, there are strong reasons for believing that the certifica-
tion requirement should be confined to natural monopoly markets, and
5
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was not the intent underlying section 390.051.6, it nevertheless accurately
describes the consequences of the operating certificate requirement. The role
of this provision in preserving the anticompetitive status quo is underscored
by court decisions holding that the P.S.C. was not properly solicitous of the
effect of new entry on incumbent certificated carriers.
27
B. Rate-Making Controls
As previously noted, the P.S.C. has the power to comprehensively
regulate the rates charged by non-exempt intrastate motor carriers. 28
Although it has apparent statutory authority to prescribe changes in rates
when such rates are "unjust, unreasonable, unjustly discriminatory or un-
duly preferential, "29 the law nowhere defines the economic standards it
should use in judging the propriety of this rate-setting. The discretion
necessarily reposed in the P.S.C. by these provisions is reinforced by the
almost complete absence of decisional authority concerning the permissi-
ble scope of industry rate-making. 30
The paucity of either statutory or judicial guidelines adds credence to
the suspicion that motor carrier rate-making is an integral part of a govern-
that, even with respect to such markets, the administration of a certifica-
tion program should take account of a broader range of factors than are
typically considered.
Id. at 514-16.
27. See, e.g., State ex rel. Orsheln Bros. Truck Lines v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
433 S.W.2d 596, 603-06 (Mo. App., K.C. 1968). See also Part V. infra.
28. See note 10 supra. Also integral to the statutory rate-making regime is Mo.
REV. STAT. § 390.116 (1978), which provides:
1. Common carriers of property may establish reasonable through
routes and joint rates, charges and classifications with other such carriers
or with common carriers by railroad or express; and common carriers of
passengers may establish reasonable through routes and joint rates, fares
or charges with other such carriers or with common carriers by railroad.
In case of such joint rates, fares, charges or classifications, it shall be the
duty of the carriers, parties thereto, to establish just and reasonable regula-
tions and practices in connection therewith, and just, reasonable and
equitable divisions thereof as between the carriers participating therein
which shall not unduly prefer or prejudice any of such participating
carriers.
2. The commission may, whenever deemed by it to be necessary or
desirable in the public interest, after hearing, upon complaint or upon its
own motion, order the establishment ofjust and reasonable through routes
and joint rates, fares, charges, regulations or practices, applicable to the
transportation of passengers or property by common carriers.
See also State ex rel. Philipp Transit Lines v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 523 S.W.2d 353,
356-57 (Mo. App., K.C. 1975).
29. Mo. REV. STAT. § 390.121 (1978).
30. The most recent decisional statement on the subject ofjoint rate-making
is found in State ex rel. Philipp Transfer Lines v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 599 S.W.2d
82, 84 (Mo. App., K.C. 1980).
6
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ment sponsored cartel benefitting primarily those firms who already hold
operating certificates. An assessment of this hypothesis begins with a survey
of the historical foundations of motor carrier regulation.
II. HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS
The policy genesis of federal motor carrier legislation is exemplified by
the Federal Motor Carrier Act of 1935, 3 1 which placed interstate trucking
within the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission (I.C.C.). 32
The history behind this legislation is well documented 33 and illustrates the
political dynamics of administrative regulation of the economy. The origins
of this regulation date to the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887.34
Enactment of the Interstate Commerce Act occurred during a period
of explosive railroad growth, when railroad rates were falling. Entry into
the railroad industry was extremely competitive and was encouraged by
liberal grants of eminent domain by the states which allowed railroads easy
acquisition of rights-of-way.3 5 This intense competition gave rise to private
cartels, with agreements to fix prices, divide markets, and pool revenues.
Since such agreements were neither illegal nor legally enforceable, 36 the in-
dustry was characterized by shifts between fluctuating and stable prices,
depending on the efficacy of private cartel enforcement. 37
31. Ch. 498, 49 Stat. 543 (1935) (codified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 301-327 (1976))
(repealed 1980).
32. Id. § 202(b) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 301 (1976)) (repealed 1980).
33. For a description of the passage of the Motor Carrier Act of 1935, see
Nelson, The Motor Carrier Act of 1935, 43 J. POL. ECON. 464 (1936).
34. Ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887) (current version at 49 U.S.C. §§ 10101-11917
(1976 & Supp. IV 1980)).
35. This historical overview of railroad development is taken largely from the
National Commission Staff Paper on Antitrust Exemptions and Immunities, 48 ANTITRUST
L.J. 1219, 1301-08 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Staff Paper].
36. The Sherman Antitrust Act, which outlaws horizontal price-fixing,
monopolization, and attempts to monopolize, was not passed until 1890, three years
after the Interstate Commerce Act. See ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified at
15 U.S.C. § 1-7 (1976)). For an excellent study of the assistance given cartel en-
forcement by the I.C.C., see P. MACAVOY, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF REGULA-
TION: THE TRUCK-LINE RAILROAD CARTELS AND THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE
COMMISSION BEFORE 1900, at 25-152 (1965).
37. One commentator contends that the problems behind the rate abuses that
led to the creation of the I.C.C. arose in an era of "rapid and chaotic expansion":
There were basically two reasons for this expansion. First, new entry, un-
justified by any reasonable prediction of demand or costs, was encouraged
by public subsidy. Second, more new entry, and fluctuations in transpor-
tation rates, as well as differing rates for similar transportation services,
was especially encouraged by the cartel dynamics of the era. Had the Sher-
man Act preceded the Interstate Commerce Act, both high and
discriminatory rates might well have been eliminated by antitrust attacks
on the railroad cartels.
Sims, Current Antitrust Exemptions andImmunities, 48 ANTITRUST L.J. 943,953 (1980).
1982] 699
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The Interstate Commerce Act was Congress's response to complaints
from railroads and their shippers about rate structure instability. Although
the I.C.C. initially lacked power to directly regulate rates, railroads were
compelled to publish their rates and not deviate from them. In the years be-
tween 1887 and 1920, the I.C.C. acquired the authority to suspend and
cancel discriminatory or excessively high or low rates and to set lawful rates.3 8
It also was given plenary authority over railroad financing, construction of
new lines, entry into and abandonment of service, and approval or disap-
proval of mergers and other control agreements involving railroads.3 9
With the extension of I.C.C. jurisdiction to barges and pipelines, its
"hegemony... over surface transportation was nearly complete" until the
1920's. 4 0 At this point, technological advances in the internal combustion
engine coupled with a vigorous increase in highway construction made it
possible for trucks to make serious competitive inroads into the freight
transportation sector. 41
Two factors converged to make possible this erosion of rail transport
dominance. First, highways became more accessible than rail transport to
many shippers.4 2 Where a shipper places a premium on speed, flexibility,
and convenience, highway motor carriage will often be the most desirable
option. 43 Second, railroads charged different rates to different users based
on differing elasticities of demand for transportation services. 4 4 The I.C.C.
acquiesced to the railroads' "value-of-service" rate-making principles, under
which the railroads charged higher rates to shippers who had no real trans-
portation alternatives and lower rates to those who did, regardless of the ac-
tual cost of service:
For example, a shipper of high-valued manufactured items, such
as machinery, could be forced to pay a high railroad rate, since there
was no other transportation alternative for this type of freight. And,
where the cost of transportation was still a small fraction of the total
38. See P. MACAVOY, supra note 36, at 123.
39. Staff Paper, supra note 35, at 1303.
40. Franzen, Enforcing a Cartel. A Study of the ICC and the Motor Carrier Industy,
11 S.W.U.L. REV. 597, 599 (1979).
41. Nelson, supra note 33, at 466-67.
42. Staff Paper, supra note 35, at 1303-04.
43. Id.
44. The concept of elasticity of demand refers to the responsiveness of the
quantity demanded to changes in price. In a perfectly competitive market, any pro-
ducer who offered output at a price above that which prevailed in such a market
would make zero sales, since every buyer would look to an alternative producer.
The demand for the output of any individual producer in such a market is thus
perfectly elastic. When trucking became a viable transportation alternative for ship-
pers, the demand for railroad transport by those shippers who were charged the
highest rates became much more elastic. See generally Landes & Posner, Market Power
in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV. 937, 940, 983-86 (1981).
700 [Vol. 47
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produce price, a high railroad rate was unlikely to elicit strong ob-
jections from the shipper.
By contrast, a shipper of bulk agricultural commodities could
avoid high railroad rates by using water transportation. Further-
more, because transportation costs are a significant fraction of the
total produce price of such commodities, increases in rates would
meet with vigorous protest from shippers of commodities of this type.
Thus, the rate structure evolved in such a way that rates were high
(both absolutely and relative to the costs of service) for high-valued
manufactured items, and low for low-valued bulk commodities.
45
In essence, trucks were frequently the best means of transport for those ship-
pers charged the highest rates. The result was an accelerated shift to truck-
ing. This change in the economics of freight transportation, enhanced by
prevailing I.C.C. rate practices, set the stage for railroad support of political
intervention in the marketplace.4 6
Beginning in the mid-1920's, proposals for I.C.C. regulation of motor
carriers were introduced in virtually every session of Congress until the Motor
Carrier Act was finally passed in 1935. 4 7 The onset of the Great Depres-
45. Staff Paper, supra note 35, at 1304. As Sims has observed:
In sum, the shipper of bulk commodities has an elastic transportation de-
mand, while the shipper of high-valued manufactured items has a relatively
inelastic transportation demand. Accordingly, a profit-maximizing railroad
would find it in its interest to charge higher prices relative to cost for the
manufactured items than for the bulk items. This is precisely what the ICC
allowed the railroads to do by adopting value-of-service ratemaking
principles.
Sims, supra note 37, at 961.
46. Staff Paper, supra note 35, at 1304-05.
47. Ch. 498, 49 Stat. 543 (1935) (codified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 301-327 (1976))
(repealed 1980). See Franzen, supra note 40, at 599. One commentator has described
the political environment leading to the passage of the Motor Carrier Act of 1935
as follows:
By 1935, besides the railroads and the ICC, the groups favoring regula-
tion of trucking included, large truckers, organized labor, and some ship-
pers. The large truckers thought that the 'irresponsible' low rates of small
truckers had led to railroad rate reductions which adversely affected all
competitive trucking. The hope of these large scale operators was that
regulation would prove more compatible with their survival and lead to
an attrition of the smaller operator. Labor was closely aligned with the large
truckers and saw the Act as a means to protect wages and working condi-
tions against the competition of the small scale enterprise and the owner-
operator. The attitude of shippers was mixed, with many unqualifiedly
opposed, viewing the Act as an effort to raise rates and ultimately restore
railroad dominance over the rate structure. However, of 161 shippers who
responded to Commissioner Eastman's inquiry, 97 percent favored some
form of regulation (enough government control at least to stabilize the in-
19821
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sion served as an important catalyst for the regulation of interstate trucking.4 8
As the railroad economy continued to deteriorate, Congress became receptive
to arguments that trucking should be subject to the kind of entry and rate
regulation already imposed on the rail sector. 49 In 1935, declining faith in
the efficacy of the marketplace produced an interstate regulatory scheme
which has been anathema to economic efficiency and derivative consumer
welfare for almost half a century. 50
III. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF REGULATION
A proper understanding of the anticonsumer implications of a regulatory
apparatus that combines entry and rate-making constraints requires a basic
discussion of relevant microeconomic theory. The principles involved,
although relatively simple, provide the basis for a powerful critique of con-
ventional attempts to use political instrumentalities to regulate inherently
competitive industries.
A. The Economic Theory
Under conditions approaching pure competition, no one firm can in-
fluence the market price of an industry product or service because the firm's
output is insignificant compared to total industry output. 51 Like any seller,
the competitor will adjust his rate of output to a point at which marginal
dustry), but only 20 percent favored complete regulation of service and
rates comparable to the existing railroad regulation.
Steinfeld, Regulation Versus Free Competition-The Current Battle Over Deregulation of Enty
,
into the Motor Carrier Industry, 45 ICC PRAc. J. 590, 595 (1978).
48. See generally Nelson, supra note 33, at 464-71.
49. Boies, supra note 25, at 614.
50. Recognizing the need to encourage competition in the interstate motor
carrier industry, Congress passed the Motor Carrier Act of 1980, Pub. L. No.
96-296, 94 Stat. 793 (codified in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.), which reduced
the ability of the ICC and existing carriers to utilize the operating certificate pro-
cess to thwart new entry. Preliminary reports indicate that this legislation is hav-
ing a healthy effect on price and service competition. In a survey of 2200 of the na-
tion's large manufacturers, 65 % reported getting lower truck rates after deregula-
tion. Among the nation's largest manufacturers with average sales of $1.2 billion,
savings in the past 12 months have averaged $1.8 million oftheir $23.7 million truck
freight bills. The recent Federal Trade Commission report evaluating the impact
of the new Act cites an estimate that rate discounting by certain leading carriers
in the year since the Motor Carrier Act of 1980 was passed cut overall rate increases
from 171% to 12 %. D. Breen, Regulatory Reform and the Trucking Industry: An
Evaluation of the Motor Carrier Act of 1980, at 27 (March 1982) (unpublished
manuscript submitted to the Motor Carrier Ratemaking Study Commission). See
also Williams, Trucking Deregulation Has Cut Rising Costs, Improved Service in a Year,
Shippers Say, Wall St. J., June 30, 1981, at 11.
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cost5 2 equals marginal revenue. 53 Marginal revenue, however, will equal
market price only for a pure competitor.5 4 Consumer welfare is maximized
under these conditions because industry output is made available to buyers
at a price that equates the real or opportunity cost (the value for other uses of
the resources used in producing the output) with the marginal cost.-' This
allocatively efficient result is a principal goal of antitrust enforcement 56 and
illustrates the competitive tendency of the motor carrier industry when
market forces are not distorted by government price and entry regulation.
In contrast to a firm in a competitive market, a monopolist possesses
sufficient economic power to restrict industry output and influence the price
52. "Marginal cost" is the increment of total cost that results from produc-
ing an additional unit of output.
53. "Marginal revenue" is the increment of total revenue that results from
selling an additional unit of output.
54. R. BORK, supra note 51, at 99.
55. As Bork observes in the context of a hypothetical widget industry:
This solution is not merely 'correct' for the industry but also for con-
sumers. The forces of competition have balanced social desires and costs
through the intermediary of the widget industry. The demand curve ex-
presses the amounts that consumers are willing to pay for widgets as against
all other uses of their purchasing power; it expresses, at all prices shown,
their desire for widgets at different prices relative to their desire for all other
things the market has to offer: automobiles, bubble gum, education, sweet
potatoes, whiskey, medical services, ski lessons, or what have you. The
demand curve thus expresses a social ranking of wants. Similarly, the
marginal cost curve expresses the cost not merely to the firnm or the industry
but to the society of producing widgets. We are talking here about real costs,
not historical costs or bookkeeping costs, and the cost of using a unit of
a resource is the maximum amount that unit could earn elsewhere. Real
costs are thus forgone alternatives or opportunities, and so they are often
called alternative or opportunity costs. These are brought home to the
widget maker through the price he must pay for factors of production. If
he must pay $50 for a ton of steel, that is the price of bidding that ton away
from alternative uses. And his cost is also the real cost to society, because
the ton of steel was valued in the alternative use at $50. Thus, when the
widget firm and the widget industry equate demand and marginal cost,
they also equate social desire and social cost. The closer the members of
the industry come to maximizing their profits, the closer they come to max-
imizing the welfare of consumers.
Id. at 97.
56. The principal doctrinal dispute in antitrust focuses largely on the emphasis
to be given short run "efficiency" considerations in antitrust enforcement versus
longer run, less verifiable economic and political factors. Although practically any
foray into competition theory is imbued with the potential to catalyze this dispute,
the conventionally identified assault on consumer welfare posed by government-
sponsored trucking cartels is, in fact, short run allocative inefficiency.
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of the product.5 7 Under monopoly conditions, marginal revenue will be less
than market price, and the profit maximizing level for the monopolist will
not be at the competitive output rate. 58 The monopolist will find it profitable
to restrict output, which increases the scarcity value of the product and bids
the price up. 59 Since output is restricted, the monopolized industry requires
fewer resources; unused resources lie wastefully idle or shift to other uses
where their marginal value is less than it would be in the monopolized
industry. 60 It is this misallocation of resources, generated by the restriction
of output and increase in price, that constitutes the principal economic argu-
ment against monopolies and cartels. 61
A related argument arises from the transaction costs incurred in at-
tempting to obtain a monopoly profit. 62 The expenditure of resources in
organizing and sustaining a cartel are social wastes. In the case of entry and
rate regulation, these transaction costs are institutionalized by the process
of obtaining a certificate of public convenience and necessity. Not only is
allocative inefficiency encouraged by rate and entry regulation, but the
regulatory process itself is a waste of resources that could be used more pro-
ductively elsewhere.
Allocative inefficiency is the most commonly recognized cost of monopo-
ly, but it is not the only one. Monopoly has also been found objectionable
on the grounds that it retards innovation, 63 redistributes income
57. Analysis of the anti-consumer welfare effect of monopoly applies equally
to arrangements where competing firms substitute price and output agreements
for independent decision making. A successful cartel has the same output-restricting
consequences (higher prices, misallocation of resources) as a single firm monopoly.
See R. BORK, supra note 51, at 101.
58. Id. at 99-101.
59. Id. At this point marginal cost and price are unequal and, given some
elasticity of demand, some consumers will refuse to buy or will reduce their pur-
chases of the monopolized good or service. Those consumers who seek alternatives
to the monopolized product will be purchasing a good that costs society more to
produce, since the value of the alternative purchase will be somewhere between the
competitive market price and the monopoly price.
60. Although some may consider the "excess profits" collected by a
monopolist an important evil, economists are concerned primarily with the
"deadweight welfare loss" to society that results from allocative inefficiency. This
loss is a function of the output restrictive effect of monopoly and is not appropriated
by either producer or consumer. See Kamerschen, The Economic Effects of Monopoly:
A Lawyer's Guide to Antitrust Economics, 27 MERCER L. REV. 1061, 1095 (1976).
61. R. BORK, supra note 51, at 101.
62. The costs involved in procuring and maintaining monopoly are discussed
in R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 10-18 (1976). See
also Posner, Exclusionary Practices and the Antitrust Laws, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 506,
508-515 (1974); Posner, The Social Costs ofMonopoly and Regulation, 83J. POL. ECON.
807, 820 (1975).
63. This argument generates disagreement among economists, in part because
the problems of measuring innovation are formidable. See Note, An Economic and
LegalAnalysis of Physical Tie-Ins, 89 YALE L.J. 769, 775 n.31 (1980).
[Vol. 47704
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unacceptably, 64 and reduces incentives for productive efficiencies. 65 As will
be demonstrated later, productive efficiency loss is a particularly serious con-
sequence of motor carrier entry and rate regulation.
B. The Natural Monopoly Argument
The traditional policy justification for public utility regulation arises from
the so-called "natural monopoly" argument. 66 An examination of this asser-
tion shows that none of the conditions necessary for a natural monopoly exists
in the motor carrier industry.
The essential cost characteristic of a theoretical natural monopoly is that
"production of the good in question exhibits decreasing marginal and average
cost over a wide range of output levels," 67 i.e., the bigger the company, the
more cheaply it can produce the good. As a result of increasing returns to
scale and unit cost advantages, large firms will have the ability to under-
price smaller firms and banish them from the market. 68 Since it would be
inefficient to prevent the concentration of an industry where scale economies
confer cost savings, the conventional approach has been to allow the monopo-
ly to develop and regulate it to avoid monopoly abuses. 69
Without digressing into an extensive investigation of the efficacy of this
type of regulation, 70 it is sufficient to observe that the cost conditions of
natural monopoly are absent in an unregulated motor carrier environment. 71
64. The distributive effects of monopoly, like the effects of innovation, are sub-
ject to dispute. Normative-community judgments concerning the proper distribu-
tion of income obviously influence this assessment to a degree not implicated by
efficiency considerations. The ascendant trend in the thinking about antitrust en-
forcement goals relegates the distributive effects of monopoly to secondary status.
See Kamerschen, supra note 60, at 1097-98; Pitofsky, The Political Content ofAntitrust,
127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051, 1059-60 (1979).
65. Williamson, Dominant Firms and the Monopoly Problem: Market Failure Con-
siderations, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1512, 1515 n.12 (1972).
66. Staff Paper, supra note 35, at 1310.
67. J. NICHOLSON, MICROECONOMIC THEORY 346-47 (2d ed. 1978).
68. Snow, The Problem of Motor Carrier Regulation and the Ford Administration's
Proposal for Reform, in REGULATION OF ENTRY AND PRICING IN TRUCK
TRANSPORTATION 3, 39 (P. MacAvoy &J. Snowxed. 1977).
69. Id.
70. For an excellent critique of some of the assumptions underlying public util-
ity regulation, see Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REV. 548
(1969).
71. At least one former official of the Missouri Public Service Commission
has candidly admitted that the theory of "natural monopoly" does not apply to
motor carrier regulation:
The underlying theory of regulation of motor carriers is completely dif-
ferent than the "natural monopoly" theory; it is, rather, ... "regulated
competition." They were regulated in an effort to protect the existing
regulated railroads from the intrusion of others who could provide an
equivalent type service. Then once some carriers became regulated, they
1982]
13
Gardner: Gardner: Entry and Rate Regulation of Interstate Motor Carriers
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1982
706 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47
The most recent studies demonstrate that there are no long run economies
of scale in the motor carrier industry. 72 The ratio of fixed costs.to variable
costs is low, 73 capital investment is not prohibitive, no sophisticated
technological capability is necessary, 74 and there are no major legal hurdles
such as patent or trade secret laws. 75 The comparative ease with which
vehicles can be transferred from one market to another makes for high
resource mobility and an extremely rapid entry response to supracompetitive
pricing. Simply put, firm size yields no cost advantage in an unregulated
motor carrier industry.7 6
The absence of structural characteristics attributable to natural monopoly
encouraged future regulation as protection against the entrance of too many
other carriers.
Baron,Jurisdiction of the Missouri Public Service Commission, 34J. Mo. B. 27, 35 (1978).
72. Klein, Market Structure and Conduct, in REGULATION OF ENTRY AND PRIC-
ING IN TRUCK TRANSPORTATION 119,119-38 (P. MacAvoy &J. Snowed. 1977).
The question of whether economies of scale exist in the motor carrier industry has
significant policy implications. If such economies exist, costs will rise less than pro-
portionately with output, marginal cost will be less than average cost, and firms
pricing at marginal cost in a competitive environment will not produce revenues
sufficient to cover their costs in the short run. In the motor carrier industry, this
translates into a concern that large interregional carriers might encroach significantly
upon the traffic of smaller intrastate carriers. Such fears are unwarranted because
once interregional carriers entered regional and intrastate markets, they would
assume the operating characteristics of those market environments:
The mass of evidence indicates that each carrier type has "adapted" to
its environment, in that each class generally attains lowest average costs
for the type of traffic it most often handles. In the event of deregulation,
current inefficient firms will face their greatest competition from firms that
will essentially replicate the current modes of operation, following a policy
of simultaneous route consolidation and route "fill-ins," as opposed to
"superlarge" firms that will attempt to usurp existing route patterns and
carrier operations. Thus, short-haul, small-shipment traffic will remain
in the hands of small firms specializing in such traffic, while long-haul,
large-shipment traffic will remain the domain of the large, interregional
carriers.
Friedlaender, Equity, Efficiency, and Regulation in the Rail and Trucking Industries, in
CASE STUDIES IN REGULATION 102, 129 (L. Weiss & M. Klass ed. 1981).
73. Calof, Private Carriage on Trial: Competition in the Motor-Transportation Industiy,
21 STAN. L. REV. 1204, 1222-23 (1969).
74. Boies, supra note 25, at 652.
75. Id.
76. A study of intrastate motor carriers in California found the following:
[I]n terms of financial stability, the ability to gross revenue per dollar of
expenditure and to generate net income from gross revenue, the small car-
riers have a significant advantage compared to their large competitors. The
tests suggested that the optimum size carrier is the small firm ... and that
* , * diseconomies of scale exist in the trucking industry.
Patton, Implications of Motor Carrier Growth and Size, TRANSP. J., Fall 1970, at 47.
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obliterates this argument for direct economic regulation of motor carriers.
The classical free market model is much more descriptive of the competitive
tendencies of an unregulated motor carrier industry. Where market
mechanisms are allowed to operate without the kind of direct regulatory in-
terference represented by entry and rate-making controls, supply and de-
mand will encourage the most efficient price/service combination. 77
IV. ANTICONSUMER CONSEQUENCES OF REGULATION
Section 390.011 of the Missouri Bus and Truck Law78 declares that it
"is enacted for the sole purpose of promoting and conserving the interests
and convenience of the public. 79 Though this aim is laudable, it is not a
meaningful description of the actual consequences of motor carrier entry
and rate regulation. Instead of protecting consumers, 0 Missouri's motor
carrier scheme increases and sustains the power of regulated private entities
to influence the pricing, output, and allocative decisions of the intrastate
motor carrier market.81 The producer-protection scenario has been historical-
ly realized in the motor carrier industry through rate regulation and entry
77. Staff Paper, supra note 35, at 1312. Recent developments in economic theory
underscore the desirability of permitting the market to make resource allocation
decisions. Contrary to conventional oligopoly theory, this research suggests that
when there is a duopoly or oligopoly for each and every good, a firm must set its
price at the competitive marginal cost level. "Optimality is not approached gradually
as the number of firms supplying a commodity (or service) grows." Baumol, Con-
testable Markets: An Uprising in the Theory of Industry Structure, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 1,
6 (1982). Thus, two firms can be enough to guarantee optimality. One of the more
important conclusions to be drawn from this research is "the questionable desirabil-
ity of artificial impediments to entry":
The new analysis merely reinforces the view that any proposed regulatory
barrier to entry must start off with a heavy presumption against its adop-
tion. Perhaps a bit newer is the emphasis on the importance of freedom
of exit which is as crucial a requirement of contestability as is freedom of
entry. Thus we must reject as perverse the propensity of regulators to resist
the closing down of unprofitable lines of activity.
Id. at 14.
78. MO. REV. STAT. §§ 390.011-.240 (1978).
79. 1d. § 390.011.
80. This Article adopts the position that "consumer welfare is greatest when
society's economic resources are allocated so that consumers are able to satisfy their
wants as fully as technological constraints permit." R. BORK, supra note 51, at 90.
Although this assumption constitutes my basic framework for argument against
motor carrier entry and rate regulation, I do not mean to exclude redistributive
effects from the public interest calculus. The transfer of wealth from shippers and
consumers to the beneficiaries of regulation is a legitimate area of public policy con-
cern which fortifies the efficiency arguments against the present motor carrier
scheme.
81. SeeJordan, Producer Protection, Prior Market Structure and the Effects of Govern-
ment Regulation, 15J.L. & ECON. 151, 153 (1972).
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controls. Both of these mechanisms are present in Missouri's motor carrier
scheme. Neither is an acceptable alternative to reliance on the kind of com-
petitively structured marketplace that would otherwise exist.
A. Rate Regulation: Horizontal Price-Fixing
The P. S.C.'s comprehensive authority over motor carrier rate-making
is supplemented by other statutory provisions affecting motor carrier pricing.
Chapter 38782 contains provisions that require common carriers to file with
the P.S.C. "schedules showing the rates, fares and charges for the trans-
portation of passengers and property" within Missouri.83 Until these
schedules are filed, no common carrier may engage in the intrastate transfer
of people or property8 4 Once filed, the rates may not be circumvented by
"any special rate, rebate, drawback or other device or method.' '85 Grant-
ing or attempting to grant lower rates is expressly prohibited. 86 In the absence
of an order from the P.S.C., changes in previously filed rates may be made
only after thirty days' notice to that agency and publication of the propos-
ed changes for thirty days. 7
The effect of these provisions is to build price rigidity into the system.
Although certain statutory provisions purportedly give the P.S.C. discre-
tion to set "just and reasonable rates and charges," 88 general commodity
rate-making is actually initiated by rate bureaus comprised of carriers
operating in a specific geographical area 89 or carrying particular
commodities. 90 These carrier representatives meet to agree on rates for the
type of traffic carried by members of the particular bureau.
In non-regulated contexts, price-fixing by competitors is a per se 9' viola-
tion of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 92 as well as state antitrust law. 93 In motor
carrier markets regulated by the I.C.C., however, pricing by rate bureaus
82. Mo. REV. STAT. 5§ 387.010-.400 (1978). See note 10 supra.
83. Id. 5387.050.1.




88. Id. §§ 387.030, .041.
89. Common carriers are represented in general commodity rate proceedings
by the Middlewest Motor Freight Bureau, which consists of carriers operating in
Wyoming, Colorado, North and South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Missouri, Iowa,
Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Illinois. See Staff Paper, supra note 35, at 1307.
90. See 4 MO. CODE ST. REG. 240-110.060.
91. In the context of antitrust law, a "per se" violation refers to those offenses
for which no defense is permitted once the prohibited activity is shown to have taken
place. Price-fixing agreements among competitors are the clearest examples of per
se violations. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223-24
(1940).
92. 15 U.S.C. 5§ 1-7 (1976).
93. See MO. REV. STAT. § 416.031 (1978).
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has been insulated by express statutory immunity.9 4 The lack of antitrust
enforcement against state rate bureau activity in Missouri suggests that the
federal immunity, or an implied variant, is somehow perceived to carry over
into intrastate markets. As I shall detail later, this perception is erroneous.
The principal criticism of collective rate-making is that it is nothing less
than horizontal price-fixing-a practice dearly prohibited under antitrust
laws. The reasons for legal prohibitions against price collusion among com-
petitors are identical to those against monopoly. The restriction of output
and price competition, the inevitable result of entry and rate regulation, in-
sures that the welfare loss to society will manifest itself in the form of higher
costs for shippers and higher prices to consumers. 95
B. Entry Regulation: Cartel Enforcement
In order to guarantee the long-term survival of a rate-fixing cartel, it
is necessary to provide an effective enforcement mechanism. 96 In the motor
carrier arena, this objective is largely accomplished by the certificate of
operating authority. 97 The inherent instability of cartels, which generates
the need for this mechanism, is particularly acute in an industry, like motor
carriage, that exhibits a strong competitive structural bias. In the absence
of some kind of administrative control over entry, formidable cartel enforce-
ment problems will emerge. 98
Assuming the initial success of a rate-fixing agreement in extorting
monopoly rents, 99 the prospect of collecting supracompetitive profits will
attract new entrants to the industry. These newcomers will obviate the
output-restricting benefits of cartel membership.100 Similarly, a recalcitrant
94. See 49 U.S.C. § 5b (1976). This federal antitrust immunity will be phased
out onJanuary 1, 1984, pursuant to the Motor Carrier Act of 1980, Pub. L. No.
96-296, § 14, 94 Stat. 793, 803 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 10706 (Supp. IV 1980)).
95. Even where rates are not collectively set by the motor carriers themselves,
the results will not comport with consumer welfare. As a result of the impossibility
of evaluating the cost structure of each firm in an industry characterized by atomized
competition, the P.S.C. must rely on a crude "average cost of service" standard.
The standard fails to reflect actual operating conditions for many carriers and
discourages cost-justified rate differentials. For example, the California Public
Utilities Commission decided to eliminate minimum rate tariffs for the hauling of
petroleum products after it found that the minimum rates had increased transporta-
tion costs to shippers and raised the ultimate price of petroleum products to con-
sumers. ST. MOT. CARR. GUIDE (CCH) 15,791 (1979).
96. See P. MACAVOY, supra note 36, at 312.
97. These certificates are equivalent to Missouri's certificate of public con-
venience and necessity. See Part I.A. supra.
98. The ensuing discussion of cartel economics is taken largely from G.
STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 231-33 (3d ed. 1966).
99. "Monopoly rent" is "a term economists apply to any return obtained by
virtue of controlling a scarce or unique factor of production." Posner, supra note
70, at 562.
100. G. STIGLER, supra note 98, at 232. See also Jordan, supra note 81, at 172.
1982]
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firm may abstain from participation in the cartel, increase its output at the
monopoly price, and thus enhance profits and expand market share. 10 The
prospect of' free rider" status will erode the kind of cooperative participa-
tion necessary to sustain the cartel. 10 2
Cartel participants, who share the same motivations as the newcomers,
also tend to undercut the agreed price in order to attract customers from
other member firms. 10 3 Where there is no effective mechanism to control
entry, the drive to maximize profits will quickly destroy the capacity of a
private cartel to function in a structurally competitive industry.
It has become increasingly apparent that the potential for anticompetitive
abuse of government instrumentalities is substantial. 0 4 This is particularly
true in operating certificate proceedings that create a framework for legalized
opposition to market entry. As we have seen, the applicant bears the burden
of proving that the public convenience and necessity would be served by his
entry into particular intrastate motor carrier markets. 0 5 This burden of pro-
ducing evidence results both in higher litigation expenses and a costly diver-
sion of the prospective entrant's time and resources.10 These costs are partic-
ularly burdensome for small firms that finance initial operations by borrowing
and have thin or nonexistent capital reserves. 0 7 Nor does the success of this
tactic depend on the ability of certificated firms to absolutely defeat entry:
The predator need not expect to defeat entry altogether. He may
hope only to delay it. Sham litigation then becomes a useful tactic
against any size firm, regardless of relative reserves, for it may be
worth the price of litigation to purchase a delay of a year or several
years in a rival's entry into a lucrative market. In such cases, suc-
cessful predation does not require that the predator be able to im-
pose larger costs on the victim, that the predator have greater reserves
101. This enforcement problem is exemplified by the recent inability of the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries to sustain pricing levels above those
desired by Saudi Arabia. See Tucker, "The Energy Crisis is Over, " HARPERS,
November 1981, at 25.
102. G. STIGLER, supra note 98, at 231-33.
103. Id. See also Hilton, The Consistency of the Interstate Commerce Act, 9 J.L. &
ECON. 87, 89-92 (1966), which confirms that virtually all railroad cartel agreements
disintegrated due to cheating by cartel members before passage of the Interstate
Commerce Act. Hilton also demonstrates that prohibitions against price discrimina-
tion facilitated horizontal price-fixing among the railroad carriers. Id. Similar pro-
hibitions are found in Missouri's motor carrier scheme at MO. REV. STAT.
390.121 (1978). See also P. MACAVOY, supra note 36, at 312.
104. See R. BORK, supra note 51, at 347.
105. State ex rel. National Trailer Convoy v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 488 S.W.2d
942, 945 (Mo. App., K.C. 1972).
106. R. BORK, supra note 51, at 347-48.
107. See generally Miklius & Casavant, Stability of Motor Carriers Operating Under
the Agricultural Exemption, in REGULATION OF ENTRY AND PRICING IN TRUCK
TRANSPORTATION 271, 278 (P. MacAvoy &J. Snow ed. 1977).
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than the victim, or that the predator have better access to capital
than the victim. No other technique of predation is able to escape
all these requirements, and that fact indicates both the danger and
the probability of predation by the misuse of governmental
processes. 108
Scrutiny of the entry control aspects of motor carrier regulation in
Missouri demonstrates how government has been enlisted on the side of cartel
enforcement. Intervention by competing carriers into the certification pro-
cess is virtually automatic. The statutory mandate that "the effect which
the proposed transportation service may have upon such carriers" be given
"reasonable consideration"10 9 is an open invitation to the P.S.C. and cer-
tificated intervenors to restrict the supply of motor carrier services and
prevent competition. Refusal or failure to procure a certificate of public con-
venience and necessity is a misdemeanor offense" ° and subjects the actor
to a "penalty of not less than $100 or more than $2,000 for each offense.""'
In the case of a continuing violation, each day's continuance is a separate
and distinct offense.' 1 2
The quantitative effects of Missouri's motor carrier cartel enforcement
scheme are difficult to measure because of crucial gaps in the data. 1 3 The
one solid piece of information available from the P.S.C. is the time differential
between contested and uncontested proceedings. Where competing or poten-
tially competing carriers do not intervene, the average length of time be-
tween the filing of a certificate application and its grant or denial is ninety
days. When intervention occurs, the average period is six to twelve months." 4
108. R. BORK, supra note 51, at 348.
109. Mo. REV. STAT. § 390.051.6 (1978).
110. Id. S 390.171.
111. Id. § 390.176.112. Id. §390.176.2.
113. The Commission's Transportation Division does not maintain the follow-
ing records: (1) the number or percentage of operating authority requests contested
by intervening common or contract carriers for the last five years, (2) the quantity
or percentage of contested operating authority requests granted or denied, and (3)
data on the percentage of intrastate traffic exempt from entry and rate regulation.
Letter from Arthur L. Conover, Director of Transportation, Missouri Public Ser-
vice Commission, to the Author (Oct. 21, 1981). Contrast this with the Florida
Public Service Commission, which kept detailed records of the disposition of both
common and contract carrier applications for each year of a five-year period begin-
ning in 1974. These records set out the total applications filed each year including
new applications and applications for extended authority, the number and percen-
tage granted as filed, the number and percentage granted with modifications, the
number and percentage withdrawn, and the number and percentage denied. See
Deffenbaugh & Hayman, Motor Carrier Deregulation in Florida: Before, During and After,
8 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 681, 690-91 (1980).
114. This information was supplied by the Transportation Division of the
Missouri Public Service Commission in response to the following question: What
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It should be emphasized that these time periods are limited to proceedings
before the P.S.C. itself. Where judicial review of P.S.C. determinations is
sought, this time period expands considerably.' 1 5
The most direct evidence of the anticompetitive consequences of entry
regulation is the fact that the certificate of public convenience and necessi-
ty is an asset that can be bought and sold for a large amount of money." ' 6
In fact, the transferability of the certificates is expressly recognized by sec-
tion 390.111 of the Missouri Bus and Truck Law.11 7 These certificates have
market value due to the entry barrier created by certification.1 1 8 As a result
of the carrier scarcity imposed by entry regulation, the investment value of
intrastate operating rights is nothing more than capitalized monopoly rent.11 9
Abolition of entry regulation would not only limit the portion of certificate
value that arises from this scarcity but might also increase legitimate business
goodwill in the industry, because motor carriers would become more depen-
dent on it and would be forced to put more effort into achieving and retain-
ing customer loyalty.1 20
is the average length of time between the filing of a request for a certificate of public
convenience and necessity and its grant or denial by the P.S.C. (a) where competing
or potentially competing carriers do not intervene, and (b) where such carriers do
intervene? Letter, supra note 113.
115. Two recent cases are illustrative. In State ex rel. Twehous Excavating Co..
v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 617 S.W.2d 104 (Mo. App., W.D. 1981), the applicant
filed for operating authority in mid-September 1976. The appellate court opinion
was handed down May 19, 1981. Similarly, in State ex rel. Inman Freight System
v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 600 S.W.2d 650 (Mo. App., W.D. 1980), the time period
between the filing of the application and the ultimate disposition in the court of ap-
peals was four and a half years.
116. The monopoly profits generated by entry and rate regulation are capi-
talized into the market value of operating certificates. In a market where free bid-
ding for the acquisition by one carrier of another's operating rights is possible, the
price paid "tends to equal the present value of the future stream of monopoly pro-
fits which the acquiring firm expects to receive from operating in an environment
where competition is suppressed." D. Breen, supra note 50, at 32. The value of the
certificates, then, provides a basis for quantifying the costs to society of cartel en-
forcement in the motor carrier industry. John Snow and Stephen Sobotka estimate
that $600 million worth of interstate certificates had been transacted by 1977, and
that the total value of pre-deregulation certificates was $3-4 billion. See Snow &
Sobotka, Certificate Values, in REGULATION OF ENTRY AND PRICING IN TRUCK
TRANSPORTATION 153, 153 (P. MacAvoy &J. Snow ed. 1977).
117. MO. REV. STAT. § 390.111 (1978).
118. Snow & Sobotka, supra note 116, at 153.
119. See Sims, supra note 37, at 973.
120. One of the few constructive provisions of the Missouri Bus and Truck Law
is contained in Mo. REV. STAT. 5 390.111 (1978):
[N]o right, privilege, or permit granted or obtained under or by virtue of
sections 390.111 to 390.176 shall ever be construed as a vested right,
privilege or permit; and the general assembly retains full legislative power
[Vol. 47
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C. Entry and Rate Regulation: Productive Inefficiency
Thus far, we have focused on the traditionally recognized allocative ef-
ficiency loss caused by entry and rate regulation of intrastate motor carriers.
This analysis embraces only part of the identifiable loss to society from this
system. Entry regulation and ancillary geographic and commodity market
partition create significant productive efficiency losses as well.
A market is considered allocatively efficient if it distributes goods or ser-
vices to all those who would purchase them at more than the cost of
production. 121 This type of efficiency "refers to the placement of resources
in the economy" and whether such resources are utilized in tasks "where
consumers value their output most." 122 In contrast, productive efficiency
refers to the ability of particular firms to effectively use resources to pro-
duce goods and services "at the lowest possible average cost."1 23 Factors
contributing to productive efficiency include scale economies, specializa-
tion of function, technological innovation, access to capital, and less tangi-
ble inputs such as management expertise and worker motivation. 24 In
essence, any activity by a firm which reduces costs will enhance productive
efficiency because such reductions free resources to produce elsewhere in
the economy.1 25
The importance of productive efficiency is illustrated by studies which
over, concerning and pertaining to the subject or subjects legislated upon
in sections 390.111 to 390.176 and the power and right to alter, amend
or repeal sections 390.111 to 390.176 at its pleasure.
This provision may become important if Missouri deregulates motor carriers and
the trucking companies attempt to obtain compensation for the lost monopoly value
of their operating rights. Such a proposal has been made in Note, Motor CarrierAct
of 1980: Toward Compensating Trucking Companies for the Loss of the Monopolistic Value
of Their Operating Rights, 34 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1981), in which the author asserts,
"Unless Congress or the judiciary compensates the trucking industry for its losses
[from deregulation], the Motor Carrier Act of 1980 treads close to robbery." Id.
at 430. This proposal not only has the effect of penalizing consumers for their
political decision to stop paying monopoly premiums resulting from entry and rate
regulation, but also creates all kinds of interesting possibilities for interest groups
who suffer adverse economic effects from legislative action. When we consider that
no motor carrier statute creates an express right to monopoly profits, the normative
judgment that deregulation is a form of "robbery" is rather astonishing. For a good
discussion of the nature of certificate values, see Snow and Sobotka, supra note 116,
at 153-56.
121. Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. CHI. L. REV.
263, 298 (1981).
122. R. BORK, supranote 51, at9l.
123. Easterbrook, supra note 121, at 298.
124. R. BORK, supra note 51, at 105. See also Leibenstein, Allocative Efficiency v.
X-Efficiency, 56 AM. ECON. REV. 392 (1966); Liebenstein, Microeconomics and X-
Efficiency Theory, in THE CRISIS IN ECONOMIC THEORY 97 (D. Bell & I. Kristol ed.
1981).
125. R. BORK, supra note 51, at 108.
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compare the theoretical tradeoffs when market dominance is achieved by
cost-saving. Although an increase in market power may produce some
allocative inefficiency, the accompanying increase in productive efficiency
will generally exceed the loss produced by expulsion of inefficient rivals from
the relevant market. 126 This is because allocative inefficiency is limited to
the range between competitive output and reduced monopoly output, while
productive efficiency takes place over the entire range of output. 27
Scrutiny of the motor carrier industry reveals no potentially vexatious
tradeoffs between productive and allocative efficiency losses because the pre-
sent entry control mechanism creates both. These losses are caused by both
the threshold certification entry barrier and the operating constraints placed
on certificated carriers.
1. Threshold Entry Barrier
A survey of the literature of industrial organization supports the pro-
position that competition encourages cost efficiency. 128 This occurs for two
reasons: (1) the information conveyed by lower profit rates alerts a firm that
it is operating inefficiently and prompts cost-saving, and (2) free informa-
tion on production techniques increases with the level of competition, reduc-
ing costs of locating more efficient technologies to individual firms. 129
A study of the gymnasium seating, rock salt, and structural steel in-
dustries found cost reductions as high as twenty-three percent after price-
fixing conspiracies were terminated.130 A study of commercial banks found
that monopolistic banks had higher labor expenses and larger staffs than
banks in more competitive environments.' 3 ' Even in the case of electric
utilities, which are described as natural monopolies by some economists,
Walter Primeaux has demonstrated that duopoly markets have cost levels
126. Oliver Williamson has pointed out that a relatively modest cost reduction
is sufficient to offset relatively large price increases even where there is a high elastici-
ty of demand. He estimates that if a merger reduces costs 5-101%, the merger must
yield price increases exceeding 20 % under upper bound elasticity of demand levels.
See Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 AM. EcON.
REV. 18, 21-23 (1968). This complicates the legal assessment of mergers under the
antitrust laws because it emphasizes the need to consider whether productive effi-
ciencies yielded by a merger outweigh the allocative efficiency losses produced by
an increase in market power. See also Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense
Revisited, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 699 (1977).
127. Easterbrook, supra note 121, at 301.
128. For a good overview of this literature, see generally Siegfried & Wheeler,
Cost Efficiency and Monopoly Power: A Survey, Q. REV. ECON. & Bus., Spring 1981,
at 25.
129. McCain, Competition, Information, Redundancy: X-Efficiency and the Cybernetics
of the Firm, 28 KYKLOS 286, 286-308 (1975).
130. Erickson, Price Fixing Conspiracies: Their Long Term Impact, 24J. IND. ECON.
189, 189-202 (1976).
131. Edwards, Managerial Objectives in Regulated Industries: Expense Preference
Behavior in Banking, 85 J. POL. ECON. 147, 147-62 (1977).
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approximately 11.7 percent below those in monopoly markets. 132 The same
studies also show that the impact of competition on productive efficiency
is greater on small firms than on similarly situated larger firms. 133 This sug-
gests that in the motor carrier industry, where size does not yield natural
monopoly scale economies, the effect of competition on cost reduction will
be significant.
The negative impact on productive efficiency caused by entry control
is predictable. We have seen that one of the factors mandated by statute for
consideration in the certification decision is the effect of new entry on ex-
isting motor carriers. 134 Nothing in creditable economic theory suggests that
this requirement serves any purpose but to restrict competition and derivative
output. Certificated firms are the principal means for enforcing this provi-
sion, and this guarantees that contested entry decisions will not be based on
marketplace efficiency considerations. To the extent new firms are barred
from entry, firms already in possession of operating authority will lack the
incentive to cut costs and lower the average industry cost level. 135
2. Productive Efficiency
The Missouri Bus and Truck Law recognizes two types of geographic
route authority: regular and irregular. A regular route is "a fixed, specific
and determined course to be traveled by a motor carrier's vehicle render-
ing service to, from or between various points, localities or municipalities
in this state."' 136 The term irregular route means that "the course or line
of travel to be used by a motor carrier's vehicle in the service is not restricted
to any specific route or routes within the area which [the] motor carrier is
authorized to serve." 137 Pursuant to its general regulatory authority, the
132. Primeaux, Some Problems with Natural Monopoly, 24 ANTITRUST BULL. 63,
76 (1979); Primeaux, An Assessment of X-Efficiency Gained Through Competition, 59 REV.
ECON. & STAT. 105, 105-08 (1977).
133. Primeaux, An Assessment of X-Efficiency Gained Through Competition, 59 REV.
ECON. & STAT. 105, 105-08 (1977).
134. Mo. REV. STAT. § 390.051.6 (1978).
135. See Leibenstein, Competition andX-Efficiency: A Reply, 81J. POL. ECON. 765,
765-77 (1973).
136. Mo. REV. STAT. § 390.020.15 (1978).
137. Id. § 390.020.8. In State ex rel. Beaufort Transfer v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
610 S.W.2d 96 (Mo. App., W.D. 1980), the court discussed the difference between
regular and irregular routes:
Under a regular route, as the name implies, points of origin and destina-
tion as well as intermediate route points are specified in the notice of
authority. The regular route carrier must also adhere to a particular
highway pattern of travel. Irregular routes, by contrast, set no advance
path of transit but under an irregular authority the carrier provides ser-
vice between its operating base and any point in Missouri subject to the
restriction that irregular carriers may not compete with regular carriers
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P.S.C. has promulgated a number of service classifications. In addition to
general commodity carriers, who truck the bulk of intrastate consumer goods,
the Transportation Division has established the following categories: (1) com-
mon carriers of passengers in school bus-type equipment, (2) carriers of bulk
commodities in dump trucks, and (3) common carriers of household goods. 138
The limitations on route and service authority of common carriers limit
competition by impeding entry into alternative geographic and service
markets. Such restrictions also contribute to inefficiency if shippers cannot
make route and commodity decisions based on marketplace demand. Where
these restrictions limit the type of cargo a firm can haul, carriers with this
authority are prohibited from loading up with other cargo even if they would
incur little additional cost. 139
The P.S.C. defends the regular-irregular distinction by pointing out that
holders of regular routes are obligated to serve those routes "in times of
famine as well as in times of plenty. "140 The doubtful benefits conferred on
the public by the common carrier obligation are discussed later.141 What
is certain is that this restriction denies to shippers located on regular routes
the economic benefits of time and route flexibility obtainable from irregular
route carriage.
Route restrictions also promote inefficiency by encouraging excessive
"interlining. 1142 Where no carrier has the necessary certificate authority
to carry a shipment its full distance, multiple carriers deliver the cargo by
transferring it at selected exchange points along the way. This practice raises
transportation costs, increases transit time, and adds to distribution costs. 143
The inefficiencies created by service and route restrictions are not limited
to regulated carriers. Many enterprises have their own truck fleets for the
delivery of goods they produce or equipment they use. The markets for these
finished products seldom correspond to the geographic location of suppliers
of raw materials. The shipper is generally unable to fill his truck with his
own goods on both legs of a round trip. 144 Due to the relatively fixed costs
incurred, it would be economical to ship goods both ways. Such efforts are
thwarted by route and commodity restrictions which may also have the ef-
fect of making private carriage exceed the cost of hiring a regulated carrier.145
V. THE ROLE OF THE COURTS
While it is true that the expertise of the P.S.C. in making proconsumer
entry decisions hardly inspires confidence, it is at least as disturbing to observe
138. See 4 MO. CODE ST. REGS. 240-110.060.
139. Snow, supra note 68, at 21.
140. In re Ben Gutman Truck Serv., 20 P.S.C. 198, 200-01 (1933).
141. See Part VII.D. infra.
142. This practice is regulated by Mo. REV. STAT. § 390.116 (1978).
143. Snow, supra note 68, at 22.
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the frequency with which the reported appellate court decisions have over-
turned procompetitive determinations by that agency. One of the more un-
fortunate aspects of Missouri's motor carrier entry and rate control system
is the degree to which the courts have been enlisted in the task of cartel en-
forcement. A survey of the decisional law reveals that this role is harmful
to both consumer welfare and the integrity of judicial institutions.
In National Trailer Convoy v. Public Service Commission, 146 the P.S.C. had
granted a certificate permitting a shipper to transport house trailers "irrespec-
tive of the location of such points on the routes of regular motor carriers." 147
After this order was affirmed by the Cole County Circuit Court, the
intervenor-protestants appealed. Citing the conventional standard of
review-that it could not substitute its judgment for that of the agency-
the court of appeals reversed on the ground that the evidence was insuffi-
cient to show either a need for an additional carrier or that the applicant
would not have a significant effect on the businesses of other authorized
carriers. 148 The court stated:
Neither is there any competent or substantial evidence to negative
the positive evidence offered by the appellants, that the grant of the
certificate of convenience and necessity to Wade would adversely
affect their business and the service presently being furnished by
them to the public. Indeed, the overwhelming evidence clearly
establishes that such adverse effect would result from the
certification. 149
A similar result was obtained in State ex rel. Orscheln Brothers Truck Lines
v. Public Service Commission. 150 This case arose from an application for an
operating certificate by Railway Express Agency (REA) to transport" general
commodities moving in express service between Kansas City and St.
Louis"1 5 1 as well as several intermediate and off-route points along U.S.
Highways 40 and 50. The court of appeals reversed both the P.S.C. and
the circuit court and held that granting the certificate to REA was "not sup-
ported by competent and substantial evidence upon the whole record." 1 5 2
In essence, the court objected to the fact that REA proposed a completely
new line-haul service, while in the past it had "merely collected the freight
from various shippers and ... shipped the various items of freight in ag-
gregate by the railroads ... [and] distributed and delivered the freight to
the various consignees." 153
State ex rel. Oliver v. Public Service Commission 51 involved an application
146. 488 S.W.2d 942 (Mo. App., K.C. 1972).
147. Id. at 943.
148. Id. at 948.
149. Id.
150. 433 S.W.2d 596 (Mo. App., K.C. 1968).
151. Id. at 597.
152. Id. at 604.
153. Id.
154. 542 S.W.2d 595 (Mo. App., K.C. 1976).
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by a bulk commodity carrier (Hardy) "for additional authority to haul heavy
equipment, machinery and commodities for others over irregular routes.' '155
Hardy was engaged in the heavy construction business and required special
road equipment. The equipment was in use only about thirty percent of the
time. 1 56 The application was an economically sensible attempt to defray fixed
costs by making more use of the assets. The grant of authority would have
been a social welfare gain because resources would not sit idle. 157
Five other carriers filed applications protesting the grant of authority
to Hardy. After an evidentiary hearing was held on Hardy's application,
the P.S.C. granted a part of the authority sought. The intervening carriers
appealed and the Cole County Circuit Court reversed the P.S.C. on the
ground that the partial grant was not supported by competent and substantial
evidence on the whole record. 158 The court of appeals affirmed, in a pro-
tectionist opinion characteristic of the reported decisions. There was
testimony by three potential customers in support of the application, but
the court held this outweighed by the need to protect the protesting
intervenors-in spite of the fact that none of the principal intervenors had
ever been contacted by any of the shippers who testified in support of
Hardy.159
The assault on consumer welfare posed by the decisional law is not
limited to the intervention aspects of acquiring a certificate of public con-
venience and necessity. Some of the most depressing case law has resulted
from the combined efforts of the P.S.C. and the appellate courts. In State
ex rel. Philipp Transfer Lines v. Public Service Commission160 (Philipp I), Philipp
Transfer Lines (Transfer) and Philipp Transit Lines (Transit) filed a sup-
plement to the Middlewest Motor Freight Bureau Common Carrier Tariff
offering "through service at joint rates to and from numerous points of origin
and destination" in Missouri,1 6' pursuant to Missouri Revised Statutes sec-
tion 390.116.162 The proposal was to combine "two irregular routes or...
an irregular route with a regular route to accomplish interlining joint
carriage."11 6 3 This request provoked the intervention of eleven carriers who
would be in possible competition with Transfer or Transit in areas affected
by the tariff.164 After hearing, the P.S.C. rejected the supplement. 165 Its order
was affirmed by the Cole County Circuit Court and further review was
sought in the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District.
155. Id. at 597.
156. Id. at 599.
157. See Part III.A. supra.
158. 542 S.W.2d at 597.
159. Id. at 601.
160. 599 S.W.2d 82 (Mo. App., W.D. 1980).
161. Id. at 83.
162. (1978).
163. 599 S.W.2d at 84-85.
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The principal argument advanced by the P.S.C. was that the appellants
could not benefit from section 390.116, which allows interlining carriers to
establish "reasonable through routes and joint rates," 166 because that statute
is limited to joint combinations of "regular" route authority. In contrast,
"irregular" authority is not "route" authority in the strict sense because
it authorizes area service, i.e., from a base area to any point in the state which
the shipper selects along courses of travel that vary depending on the
destination. 167 The P. S.C. argued that to allow interlining between regular
routes, or irregular routes in combination with regular routes, would result
in "the creation by the joint tariff of a regular route in contravention of ex-
clusive Commission authority on the subject.' 1 68 In essence, the P.S.C.
feared that the appellants were embarking on an activity which would allow
evasion of the certification process.
The procompetitive implications of the appellants' supplement tariff were
further underscored by the arguments advanced by the intervening carriers.
In the words of the court:
Intervenors, the competing motor carriers, join in the arguments
advanced by the Commission, and also contend that the proposed
interlining will permit Transfer and Transit to compete with regular
route carriers by duplicating regular route service and yet enjoy the
advantage of call and demand service characteristic of irregular route
certification. This, they say, will divert shipments from the regular carriers
to their economic loss and will undermine the concept of dependable
service available to the public on the schedules which assure motor
freight transport on regular routes. Additionally, it is argued that
the net consequence would be a proliferation of routes for which no
necessity has been demonstrated. 1 69
The P.S.C. and its certificated clientele may have been alarmed by two
prior decisions that potentially weakened cartel enforcement. In State ex rel.
Philipp P. L. v. Public Service Commission 70 (Philipp I), the court of appeals held
that the power to establish through routes is vested in the carriers and that
the P.S.C. lacked jurisdiction to determine whether such routes were
reasonable. ' 7 1 In State ex rel. Beaufort Transfer.v. Public Service Commission, 172
the court held that competing carriers had no right to a hearing or to in-
tervention in proceedings to transfer or sell certificate authority.173 Both deci-
sions had a potentially salutary effect on competition because they limited
the ability of the P.S.C. to prevent entry into new geographic markets and
166. Mo. REV. STAT. § 390.116 (1978).
167. 599 S.W.2d at 85.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 85-86 (emphasis added).
170. 523 S.W.2d 353 (Mo. App., K.C. 1975).
171. Id. at 356.
172. 593 S.W.2d 241 (Mo. App., W.D. 1979).
173. Id. at 249. The certificates are salable under Mo. REV. STAT. § 390.111
(1978). See text accompanying notes 116-20 supra.
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the ability of competing carriers to impede new entry based on certificate
transfer or sale.
In Philipp II, however, the court of appeals reverted to an anticompetitive
construction of the motor carrier regulatory scheme. In the course of refus-
ing to allow discretionary interlining, the court rejected the I.C.C.'s prac-
tice of "permitting joint service regardless of whether the combination is
of regular or irregular routes, as long as the certificates contained no express
restrictions to the contrary."1 74 The court observed that the nature of ir-
regular routes, which are not limited to established pathways or destinations,
precluded P. S.C. control over what routes might evolve if combinations in-
volving irregular routes were allowed. The court expressed concern that "the
interchange of freight between regular and irregular routes permits the
regular route carrier to reach points of destination in the state for which it
has shown no public need and effectively extends the regular carriers route
without the control of Commission certification." '175
The court also grounded its decision on section 390.051.8 of the Missouri
Bus and Truck Law, which reads:
It shall be unlawful for any common carrier, except one having a
certificate authorizing such service, to accept persons or property
for transportation between points on the route of a regular route com-
mon carrier or between points on the routes of two or more regular
route common carriers where through or joint service has been
authorized or established between such regular route common
carriers.16
The opinion interpreted this language as prohibiting certificated irregular
route carriers from transporting goods between points on the route of a
regular route or joint service common carrier. The court justified this in-
terpretation by citing with favor language from an Ohio decision that reached
a similar protectionist result: "In the view of the commission, the proposals
here made, if allowed to go into effect, would completely disrupt the system
of regulation which has been functioning for many years, and under which
the motor carriers of this state have developed their service and facilities in
competitive balance." 77
The unifying theme of the reported decisions is the protectionist func-
tion of the certification process. Government regulatory policy should en-
courage economic efficiency and thereby maximize consumer welfare. To
be concerned with whether new entry into the motor carrier industry will
174. 599 S.W.2d at 86.
175. Id. at 87. In a statement that can only be described as perverse in light
of the actual effects of entry and rate regulation, the Philipp II court asserts: "Such
rules are esgential to the authority of the Commission to control service in the public
interest." Id. at 88.
176. Mo. REV. STAT. § 390.051.8 (1978).
177. 599 S.W.2d at 88 (quoting E. A. Schlairet Transfer Co. v. Public Utilities
Comm'n, 174 Ohio St. 554, 557, 190 N.E.2d 910, 912 (1963)).
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"divert business" from existing carriers is both irrelevant to sound economic
policy and antithetical to consumer welfare.
This criticism should not be construed as an argument that proper super-
vision of entry and rate regulation could increase consumer welfare. Such
marketplace intrusion has inherent anticompetitive consequences, and no
court decision can convert this government-sanctioned cartel into a system
capable of operating in the public interest. Even where agency and judicial
decisionmaking is arguably procompetitive, the delay and cost imposed by
the certification process deters many who would otherwise be capable of pro-
viding carrier service.
The courts should stop attempting to rationalize an indefensible
regulatory system. This can be accomplished, in part, by refusing to enforce
anticompetitive P.S.C. actions that lack express legislative support.178 There
is abundant case law establishing competition as a factor to be considered
in motor carrier entry decisions. 17 9 At the very least, Missouri courts should
resist the impulse to exalt the policy errors of other jurisdictions.
VI. COMPARATIVE COSTS OF ENTRY AND RATE REGULATION
This Article has pointed out the economic flaws inherent in entry and
rate regulation of the motor carrier industry. How much does this regula-
tion cost consumers? Studies at the national, international, and state levels
provide some answers.
A. National Studies
Some 6f the earliest evidence of the effect of entry and rate regulation
on motor carrier pricing appeared in the 1950's, when various agricultural
commodities were exempted from I.C.C. regulation. The United States
Department of Agriculture found that rates for fresh and frozen poultry
declined thirty-three percent and thirty-six percent, respectively, after they
were deregulated in 1952.180 The same study also found that types of ser-
vices offered expanded, quality of services improved, schedules became more
178. Judicial review of P.S.C. determinations is limited to whether there is
"substantial evidence" to support the agency's decision. State ex rel. Churchill Truck
Lines v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 555 S.W.2d 328, 335 (Mo. App., K.C. 1977). This
limited review function bars the court from trying cases de novo and weighing the
evidence. State ex rel. Crown Coach Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 238 Mo. App.
287, 302, 179 S.W.2d 123, 130 (K.C. 1944). Thus, reviewing courts are prohibited
from substituting theirjudgments as to facts for those of the P. S.C. and must limit
their review to whether the P.S.C. could have reasonably made its findings and
reached its results on consideration of all of the evidence before it. State exrel. Oliver
v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 542 S.W.2d 595, 598 (Mo. App., K.C. 1976).
179. See, e.g., Sharron Motor Lines v. United States, 633 F.2d 1115, 1117-18
(5th Cir. 1981); Niedert Motor Serv. v. United States, 583 F.2d 954, 963 (7th Cir.
1978).
180. Jordan, supra note 81, at 166.
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convenient, and in-transit motor time was reduced. 181 Not only were trucks
readily available, but there was an increased willingness to haul less than
full loads, make multiple pickup and delivery stops, make mid-route destina-
tion changes, and serve thinly populated, out-of-the-way locations.1 82 A
similar result occurred when frozen fruits and vegetables were exempted in
1956. At a time when rail rates for these products increased from six to four-
teen percent, the weighted average motor carrier rates for hauling these items
declined nineteen percent after deregulation. 1 3
In March 1982, the first comprehensive evaluation of the 1980 deregula-
tion provisions was submitted to the Motor Carrier Ratemaking Study Com-
mission by the Bureau of Economics of the Federal Trade Commission.184
The principal focus of the report was the effect of the liberalized entry and
rate setting provisions of the Motor Carrier Act of 1980.185 The report found
that a variety of rate discounts have appeared since deregulation. These range
from across-the-board percentage reductions often to fifteen percent to more
selective multiple tender rates186 and promotional discounts.187 Not only have
numerous carriers filed discount tariffs with the I.C.C. for specifically named
shippers but some carriers have chosen to reduce rates indirectly "by im-
proving the quality of service offered at current rates." 88 The net result of
this combination of improved service and rate-cutting is that shippers will
have more diversified price/service options from which to choose.
The report observed that, while nominal trucking rates continued to rise
181. T. MOORE, TRUCKING REGULATION: LESSONS FROM EUROPE 140-41
(1976).
182. Snow, supra note 68, at 13.
183. T. MOORE, supra note 181, at 139-40.
184. D. Breen, supra note 50. The Ratemaking Study Commission was
established by Congress "to investigate collective ratemaking and determine
whether antitrust immunity for the collective determination of trucking rates should
continue." Id. at 1.
185. In the Motor Carrier Act of 1980, Congress directed the I.C.C. to purge
unnecessary geographic and commodity restrictions and to establish procedures
that would promote the expeditious consideration of requests for operating authori-
ty. The Act liberalizes entry requirements and shifts to protesting carriers the burden
of proving that the proposed service would be inconsistent with the public conven-
ience and necessity. The Act also allows carriers to raise or lower rates by as much
as 10% without permission from the I.C.C. See 49 U.S.C. § 10708(d), 10922
(Supp. IV 1980).
186. Multiple tender rates are discounts provided "when separate shipments
arc tendered for pickup at the same time with the size of the discount depending
on the aggregate weight involved." D. Breen, supra note 50, at 25.
187. Promotional discounts are generally offered in order to establish a com-
petitive toehold in a particular market. For example, Roadway Express has offered
promotional discounts to build up business in its new northwest marketing territory.
Id.
188. Id. at 26. The example provided by the report is one company that offers
"guaranteed delivery with penalties ranging up to 20 percent for delayed service."
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faster than the rate of inflation in the year after passage of the Act, rate dis-
counting reduced the increase to twelve percent, or the approximate rate
of inflation for the economy as a whole during that period.18 9 "Overall,"
concluded the report, "the evidence suggests that regulatory reform has
served to restrain rate increases in the trucking industry." 90
B. International- Studies
Studies of systems in other countries have shown similar results. A
statistical evaluation of Canadian motor carrier entry and rate regulation
found that revenues per ton-mile of unregulated trucking were 6.73 percent
lower than revenues per ton-mile in regulated areas' 91 and that rates in pro-
vinces without regulation were approximately nine to twelve percent lower
than in regulated provinces. 92
One of the most comprehensive international comparisons embraced
five European countries (Great Britain, West Germany, Belgium, the
Netherlands, and Sweden) and supports the conclusion that regulation
reduces efficiency, increases rates, and impedes the quality of service.193 Bas-
ed on 1973 freight rates, it was found that in West Germany, with the most
heavily regulated motor carrier industry,194 the rate per ton-mile was over
fifty percent higher than in any other European country.195 After the British
motor carrier industry was deregulated in 1971, a real reduction in motor
rates occurred, while West German rates increased.
96
C. State Studies
Studies from other states support these findings. An analysis of the essen-
189. Id. at 27.
190. Id.
191. Sloss, Regulation of Motor Carrier Freight Transportation: A Quantitative Evalua-
tion of Policy, 1 BELLJ. ECON. & MGMT SCI. 327, 351 (1970). As Moore points out,
Sloss may actually have underestimated the difference:
First, Sloss lumped all "regulated" in Canada with the United States.
Regulation is considerably more comprehensive in the United States than
in any province of Canada. In fact, one of his "regulated" provinces-
British Columbia-does not, according to extraprovincial carriers, regulate
rates. On the other hand, several provinces in the "unregulated" area do
require the publication of rates and adherence to them, so that much of
the "unregulated" sector is controlled in some way. Moreover, if regula-
tion raised rates an average of 20 percent, those rates that went up the most
would be expected on average to lead to the greatest reduction in traffic.
As a consequence revenues per ton-mile would be expected to rise by much
less than 20 percent.
T. MOORE, supra note 181, at 141.
192. See Jordan, supra note 81, at 166.
193. T. MOORE, supra note 181.
194. Id. at 122.
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tially unregulated' 97 intrastate motor carrier industry in New Jersey con-
cluded that unregulated intrastate rates were lower than I.C.C. regulated
rates for comparable commodities, distances, and weights. 198 The mean
range of intrastate savings for large shippers was 9.7 to 15.2 percent less than
would have been paid under the interstate Mid-Atlantic Motor Carrier
Tariff. 1 99 The range of savings for small shippers was somewhat less, 200 due
partly to lack of knowledge concerning rate alternatives to the Mid-Atlantic
tariff.201
The implied linkage between lower costs and an unregulated motor car-
rier environment was strengthened by two other findings. First, lower rate
intrastate carriers were found to have lower operating ratios20 2 than carriers
certified by the I.C.C.,203 indicating that costs are lower in the absence of
entry, rate, and operating constraints.2 0 4 Second, the shippers who benefit
most directly from lower rates overwhelmingly preferred New Jersey's
unregulated motor carrier environment over I.C.C.-type regulation, 20 5 while
among small shippers, a slightly smaller eighty-nine percent favored keep-
ing the state unregulated.2 0 6
One of the most recent assessments of the costs of intrastate motor car-
rier regulation examined the regulatory system in Kansas207 to determine
whether the Kansas Corporation Commission should continue to operate.2 0 8
197. Household goods movers, solid waste haulers, and bulk commodity car-
riers are subject to a limited amount of state regulation in areas such as safety and
consumer protection. None of these carrier classifications are comprehensively
regulated in the entry and rate control sense.
198. Allen, Lonergan & Plane, Examination of the Unregulated Trucking Ex-
perience in NewJersey 166-67, (December 1979) (available through Nat'l Technical
Information Svc., Springfield, Va. 22161).
199. Id. at 179.
200. Id.
201. Id. In some instances, rates 30-60 % below regulated rates were negotiated
by shippers in the unregulated intrastate market.
202. Carrier operating ratios are computed by dividing expenses by revenues.
Low operating ratios are generally cited as an indicator of superior efficiency.
203. NewJersey motor carriers operating strictly intrastate were found to have
lower operating ratios (88. 11) than I.C.C. certificated carriers operating in the in-
trastate NewJersey market (95.92). Allen, Lonergan & Plane, supra note 198, at 175.
204. Id. at 180. The authors were careful to point out that it was unclear whether
lower costs in intrastate markets were due to the absence of an institutional con-
straint, i.e., organized labor.
205. Id. at 178-79. In addition, 97% of all shippers contacted thought intrastate
service levels were better than or equal to interstate service levels. Id. at 182.
206. Id. at 178-79.
207. State of Kansas, Legislative Division of Post Audit, Sunset Audit
Report-Kansas Corporation Commission Motor Carrier Regulatory Program
(September 25, 1981) [hereinafter cited as Audit Report].
208. The report was prepared pursuant to the Kansas Sunset Law, KAN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 74-7226, -7237 (1980). See Audit Report, supra note 207, at S-1.
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The report estimated both the direct costs imposed by route, equipment,
and commodity restrictions and the wealth transfer produced by rate bureau
cartel pricing. 20 9 To measure these balance sheet costs, the auditors selected
four commodity classifications-general commodities, livestock, certain
petroleum products, and household goods-which account for about thirty-
four percent of the dollar value of all intrastate shipping traffic in Kansas. 210
Regulated rates for the selected commodities were compared with rates for
the same commodities in unregulated jurisdictions. The report concluded
that the total direct cost to Kansas shippers from operating inefficiencies,
administrative costs, and direct compliance costs was $19 million.211
The report recommended abolition of entry and rate regulation and
enactment of legislation to make rate bureaus subject to the antitrust laws. 212
Although new legislation is probably not necessary to successfully prosecute
horizontal price-fixing by rate bureaus or their commodity-based
equivalents2 13 in Missouri, legislation may be necessary to attack the whole
range of anticompetitive activity2 14 and to catalyze timid state antitrust
enforcement. 215
D. Summary
The net economic result of entry and rate regulation in the motor car-
rier industry is allocative and productive inefficiency. If the results of studies
in other jurisdictions are any guide, this regulation costs the citizens of
Missouri millions of dollars annually.
The partial deregulation of the interstate motor carrier industry was
largely a response to findings that federal entry and rate-making controls
were costing consumers billions of dollars a year.216 Such findings no doubt
209. Audit Report, supra note 207, at 40-45.
210. Id. at 41.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. In Missouri, these are referred to as service classifications. See4 MO. CODE
ST. REG. 240-110.060.
214. The right of competitors to intervene in the certification process invites
collusive non-price activity harmful to competition. This could take the form of
agreements among certificated carriers to oppose applications for route authority.
See Clipper Exxpress v. Rocky Mountain Motor Tariff Bureau, 674 F.2d 1252 (9th
Cir. 1982) (antitrust action attacking such agreements).
215. Recent pronouncements from the Missouri Attorney General suggest that
this should not be a major problem. See generally Ashcroft, A Renewed Commitment
to State Antitrust Enforcement and a State Policy of Competition: The Missouri Experience,
46 MO. L. REV. 469 (1981).
216. See generally T. MOORE, FREIGHT TRANSPORTATION REGULATION 80(1972). More recently, in an application of regression analysis to operating certificate
values, James Frew noted:
[T]he present regulatory environment has resulted in a schedule of freight
rates so consistently in excess of costs that monopoly profits can be
1982]
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influenced the recent decisions of Florida217 and Arizona 218 to substantially
deregulate their indigenous motor carrier industries. The strong theoretical
and empirical case against entry and rate control of structurally competitive
industries should at least cause the Missouri General Assembly to examine
the reasons for the gap between public interest folklore and actual per-
formance of intrastate regulation of motor carriers in Missouri. 219
VII. ARGUMENTS FAVORING REGULATION
The failure of motor carrier entry and rate regulation to command the
allegiance of reputable economic theory is underscored when we examine
the arguments against deregulation advanced by apologists for the motor
carrier status quo. None withstands analysis.
A. Industrial Concentration
Opponents of deregulation contend that it would yield destructive rate
competition, leading to long-run dominance by a few firms. These remaining
firms would use their monopoly positions to increase prices and reduce ser-
vices at the expense of shippers and consumers.
estimated for broad certificate classes simply by determining the level of
service demand that is present in the service area....
Since shipping rates consistently exceed [noncertificate] costs of shipping,
consumers pay higher prices than they would if the services were priced
at cost. Motor carriers receive compensation that exceeds the cost of pro-
viding the services. As long as rates continue to exceed costs, command
over resources is shifted from consumer to producer. Traditional economic
theory predicts that rate reductions could be accomplished by eliminating
rate bureaus, preventing carriers from colluding to set prices, and
eliminating industry-entry restrictions. The Motor Carrier Reform Act
of 1980 takes a first step in this direction, and unless economic rents for
motor carriers are deemed socially desirable, policies to reduce rents should
be continued.
Frew, The Existence of Monopoly Profits in the Motor Carrier Industy, 24J.L. & ECON.
289, 314-15 (1981).
217. Entry and rate regulation of intrastate motor carriers in Florida was re-
pealed on July 1, 1980, by that state's "sunset review" process. See generally
Regulatory Reform Act, ch. 76-168, § 3(2)(h), 1976 Fla. Laws 295, 298 (repealing
FLA. STAT. ch. 323 (1979)).
218. 1979 Ariz. Sess. Laws 801, ch. 203, 5 1 repealed ARIZ. REV. STAT. 5
40-601 to -620 effective July 1, 1982, contingent on voter approval of an amend-
ment to ARIZ. CONST. art. 15, § 2 removing the power of the Arizona Corporation
Commission to regulate motor carriers. That amendment passed on November 4,
1980. See 1981 Ariz. Leg. Serv. A-55 (West).
219. For additional evidence that entry and rate regulation has the effect of
cartelizing the trucking industry, see generally Boyer, EqualizingDiscrimination and
Cartel Pricing in Transport Rate Regulation, 89J. POL. ECON. 270 (1981).
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The implausibility of this argument becomes apparent when we recall
the structurally competitive tendencies of the motor carrier industry. 220 Left
unregulated, this industry is characterized by insignificant economies of scale.
If market processes eliminate inefficient firms, low entry barriers make it
impossible for the survivors to raise rates above the efficient level. Efforts
to do so would attract new entrants into the market, who would undercut
attempts by the surviving firms to collect monopoly rents. The irony of the
concentration argument is revealed when we consider that the only serious
opportunity for realization of such a scenario is through the type of





It has long been a staple of populist economics that large firms with ex-
tensive financial resources can eliminate competitors by cutting prices. 222
It was through the selective reduction of prices in competitive segments of
the petroleum market, financed by higher prices charged in markets where
it possessed a monopoly, that the Standard Oil Company allegedly eliminated
or forcibly merged with the competition. This activity is thought to have
been instrumental in Standard's acquisition of a ninety percent share of the
220. See Part III. supra.
221. The fear that deregulation would produce significant industrial concen-
tration in the motor carrier industry is further undermined by the early experience
with federal deregulation:
There is no evidence indicating that the passage of the MCA [the Motor
Carrier Act of 19801 has moved the truckload sector in the direction of
dominance by a few large carriers .... With the MCA's relaxation of
regulatory barriers there has been an influx of small scale TL competitors
and non-union owner operators, in particular, have been able to under-
cut the rates of large established common carriers on front-haul traffic.
Many large common carriers are experiencing declining market shares on
TL freight, which suggests that the effect of the MCA may have been to
reduce concentration in this sector.
D. Breen, supra note 50, at 34-35 (footnote omitted). The report also discusses firms
in the less-than-truckload sector, where again there is little evidence that the large
carriers are growing at the expense of small carriers.
Large carriers do seem to be expanding but this is being accomplished by
entering each other's marketing territories, not via horizontal mergers..
. This method of expansion may lead to an industry with fewer firms but
the evidence to date does not support this proposition. Some small carriers
are being forced to leave the industry but an even larger number seem to
be entering. Nor is there any evidence that large carriers are systematically
underpricing smaller competitors or consistently earning higher profits.
Id. at 35-36 (footnote omitted).
222. See generally Dixon, Price Discrimination and the Sherman Act, 27 A.B.A. SEC.
ANTITRUST L. REP. 14 (1965).
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domestic market for refined petroleum products by the time of the 1911
Supreme Court-ordered divestiture. 223 Though this scenario may appeal to
those who subscribe to the demonology of predatory capitalism, it is not an
intellectually respectable argument in favor of entry and rate regulation of
the motor carrier industry.
The first difficulty confronted by legal sanctions against predatory pricing
is distinguishing "predatory" pricing from competition on the merits. Ef-
forts to do so have spawned an exhaustive literature. 224 This commentary
focuses on how to identify and punish pricing practices that are economically
undesirable without discouraging the kind of price competition that enhances
consumer welfare. 225 Some commentators doubt this task can be accomplish-
ed by the legal system and question the desirability of attempting to do so. 226
Even among those who would impose legal sanctions, there is little agree-
ment. The effort to advance a bright line cost formulation 227 for the iden-
tification of predatory pricing has met with a barrage of academic criticism 2
28
and increased judicial resistance. 229 There is no indication that the Missouri
223. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
224. Recent interest in this topic was generated by Areeda & Turner, Predatory
Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697
(1975). See note 228 infra for a collection of responsive law review commentary.
225. For a revealing exchange on this subject, see Debate: Should the Sherman Act
be Amended to Broaden the Offense of Attempt to Monopolize?, 48 ANTITRUST L.J. 1433
(1979).
226. See R. BORK, supra note 51, at 342; Easterbrook, supra note 121, at 298.
227. See Areeda & Turner, supra note 224, at 706. For a later exposition of this
proposal, see III P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW §§ 711-722 (1978).
228. Major critical assessments of the Areeda-Turner approach to cost-based
predatory pricing rules include Baumol, Quasi-Permanence of Price Reductions: A Policy
for Prevention of Predatory Pricing, 89 YALE L.J. 1 (1979); Brodley & Hay, Predatory Pric-
ing: Competing Economic Theories and the Evolution of Legal Standards, 66 CORNELL L.
REV. 738 (198 1);Joskow & Klevorick, A FrameworkforA nalyzing Predatory Pricing Policy,
89 YALE L.J. 213 (1979); Posner, The Chicago School ofAntitrustAnalysis, 127 U. PA.
L. REV. 925 (1979); Scherer, Predatory Pricing and the Sherman Act: A Comment, 89
HARV. L. REV. 869 (1976); Scherer, Some Last Words on Predatory Pricing, 89 HARV.
L. REV. 901 (1976); Williamson, Williamson on PredatoryPricinglI, 88 YALE L.J. 1183
(1979).
229. In the recent case of William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continen-
tal Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014, 1032-36 (9th Cir. 1981), the Ninth Circuit, noting
academic criticism of the "average variable cost pricing" test as the conclusive
predatory pricing standard, refused to hold that pricing above average variable cost
was insulated from antitrust attack:
[T]o establish predatory pricing a plaintiff must prove that the anticipated
benefits of defendant's price depended on its tendency to discipline or
eliminate competition and thereby enhance the firm's long-term ability
to reap the benefits of monopoly power. If the defendant's prices were below
average total cost but above average variable cost, the plaintiff bears the
burden of showing defendant's pricing was predatory. If, however, the
36
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P.S.C. is even attentive to this dialogue, much less willing or capable of iden-
tifying the existence of predatory pricing.
230
The second difficulty with the predatory pricing argument arises from
the steadily accumulating evidence that such behavior is extremely rare. In-
deed, there is considerable doubt whether the oft-cited Standard Oil model
describes any real world phenomenon. 231 Under that model, the predator
firm uses its deep pocket to finance below-cost sales in order to eliminate
competitors. After achieving a monopoly position, the predator recoups its
losses by subsequent monopoly pricing.
The problem with this is that predation will likely impose prohibitive
costs on the dominant firm, which must forfeit the difference between the
competitive and predatory price. 232 Such a strategy will be much more costly
to the predator than to its small competitors because the predator will incur
a per-sale loss multiplied by the quantity of units sold. 233 Since the price
reduction compels the sale of additional units to clear the market, marginal
costs will generally be higher for the predator. Firms with the largest market
shares will lose money the quickest. 234 When we also consider the numerous
survival tactics available to smaller firms, 235 the viability of predatory pric-
ing as a rational strategy for nascent monopolists becomes doubtful.
Predatory pricing is made even more dubious where the relevant market
lacks high entry barriers. Unless new entry can be barred, the monopolist
will be unable to recoup the losses it sustained in pursuit of monopoly,
236
because any attempt to charge a post-predation monopoly price will attract
plaintiff proves that the defendant's prices were below average variable
cost, the plaintiff has established a prima facie case of predatory pricing
and the burden shifts to the defendant to prove that the prices were justified
without regard to any anticipated destructive effect they might have on
competitors.
Id. at 1035-36.
230. No reported appellate court or Missouri Public Service Commission deci-
sion delineates standards to be used in determining the existence of predatory
rate-setting.
231. See R. BORK, supra note 51, at 146. This position was first elucidated in
McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case, 1 J.L. & ECON. 137
(1958), and more recently in McGee, Predatory Pricing Revisited, 23 J.L. & ECON.
289 (1980); Easterbrook, supra note 121, at 313-14.
232. Easterbrook, supra note 121, at 268.
233. Brodley & Hay, supra note 228, at 741.
234. Easterbrook, supra note 121, at 268.
235. Among these tactics, Easterbrook includes borrowing sufficient to allow
the victim firm to ride out a predatory pricing foray, long term contracts to customers
at less than the monopoly price a predator would charge if it drove out competi-
tion, and production cutbacks by the victim which compel the predator to satisfy
an even larger part of market demand at correspondingly greater losses. Id. at
268-76.
236. Id. at 271-72.
37
Gardner: Gardner: Entry and Rate Regulation of Interstate Motor Carriers
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1982
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
new entrants. 237 In the absence of regulation, the low entry barriers that
characterize the motor carrier industry make it an inhospitable environment
for monopoly recoupment of losses incurred from predatory pricing.2 38
Finally, even if a plausible case for predatory pricing can be hypothesized
in unregulated motor carrier markets, there is no evidence that the Public
Service Commission can address the problem more effectively than conven-
tional antitrust enforcement.2 39 Indeed, the fact that the firm targeted for
predation will be aware of the downward change in market price makes it
the logical candidate for detecting predation and initiating appropriate an-
titrust enforcement proceedings.2 40 This incentive is reinforced by the private
treble damage remedy. 24 1
C. Market Chaos
This argument suggests that deregulation would encourage blind, fren-
zied entry and exit from markets with rapidly fluctuating price and service
levels. Shippers and customers would be uncertain as to the availability of
particular carriers and the rates charged. Long-run planning would be im-
possible for both shippers and carriers. 242 Wasteful excess capacity would
be encouraged, business failures would be frequent, and the overall motor
carrier service market would cease to function.2 43 Although this image has
a certain intuitive logic for those not familiar with the workings of the
unregulated marketplace, it amounts to nothing more than fiction posing
as economic theory.
It is important to note that the survival of individual firms is not a gain
for consumer welfare if those firms are inefficient and if that inefficiency is
preserved through regulation. In a dynamic marketplace, certain kinds of
productive capacity will become redundant. The losses resulting from this
excess capacity are the means by which information is conveyed that it
exists. 244 It is through these losses that an economy allocates resources into
more desired activities. 245 Consumer welfare is enhanced by encouraging
this kind of resource mobility.
237. As Easterbrook points out, even if the victim flees the market or declares
bankruptcy, the productive assets still exist and await utilization as soon as the
predator attempts monopoly recoupment. Id.
238. See Part III.B. supra.
239. See Breyer, Analyzing Regulatoty Failure: Mismatches, Less RestrictiveAlternatives,
and Reform, 92 HARV. L. REV. 547, 578 (1979) (structurally competitive markets
are particularly good candidates for deregulation with policing by antitrust).
240. Easterbrook, supra note 121, at 331.
241. See 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976 & Supp.IV 1980); Mo. REV. STAT. § 416.121
(1978).
242. Snow, supra note 68, at 35.
243. Id.
244. Calof, supra note 73, at 1225.
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Although the demise of an inefficient firm may create temporary discom-
fort for its owners and employees, it is nevertheless a net social gain. 246 The
failure implicit in the market chaos argument arises from the inability or
unwillingness of its proponents to recognize that a comprehensive regulatory
scheme is only legitimized to the extent it enhances the welfare of consumers
at large. That an unregulated marketplace' will cull out inefficient producers
is no justification for government intervention; indeed, it is a powerful argu-
ment against it.
Even if we assume that "market chaos" describes something about which
the law should be concerned, the available empirical data indicates that
unregulated motor carriage would be no more "chaotic" than any other
competitive market. A study analyzing the market stability of nonregulated
agricultural t-rucking247 found not only that entry rates were comparable with
those of other service businesses, but that the bankruptcy rate of exempt
agricultural carriers was actually lower than any of the manufacturing in-
dustries and ranked with the lowest in the retail trades. 248 The implications
of this study are reinforced by the apparent ability of other markets not subject
to entry and rate regulation to function efficiently without "chaos."
Nothing prevents firms in these markets from making long term price
and service commitments. 249 The notion that regulation brings some kind
of desirable "stability" to the marketplace is further discredited because,
as we have seen, conventional market incentives produce service and price
responses superior to those available in regulated contexts. "Market chaos"
is nothing more than a simplistic metaphor mistakenly assumed to describe
246. This is true even where a motor carrier firm exits a market by way of
bankruptcy:
In the majority of cases, the firms simply discontinue business, discharge
employees, sell off assets, and shut down. When this happens the resources
formerly used there revert to their next best source of income. Aside from
the general state of economy, one of the main determinants of the impact
is the mobility of these resources, which in turn depends on their specializa-
tion. Other things being equal, the employees of an industry that requires
skills specific to that industry will suffer greater decreases in income than
the employees of an industry that utilizes easily transferable skills. Similar-
ly, owners of specialized assets locked into specific locations will suffer
greater capital losses.
On both counts, relative to other industries, the impact of exits ...
should be minimal. Drivers' skills are easily transferable among all sec-
tors of the motor carrier industry as well as to the private firms. The truck,
truck-tractor, and most trailers are neither specialized nor irrevocably com-
mitted to specific markets or regions. The existence of a secondhand equip-
ment market allows a greater fraction of the initial investment to be
recovered on liquidation.
Miklius & Casavant, supra note 107, at 274-75.
247. Id. at 271-301.
248. Id. at 283.
249. Snow, supra note 68, at 35.
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the competitive marketplace. Like other myths, it should be consigned to
the grave of historical curiosities and resuscitated only for instruction on the
pitfalls of regulatory sloganeering.
D. Protecting Service to Small Communities
The argument that harmful rate discrimination will ensue from elimina-
tion of entry and rate controls is based on two related assumptions. First,
since low density rural service is unremunerative, it can only be maintained
by subsidization from low cost, high density inter-urban routes. Second,
in return for protection from new entrants, certificated carriers are held to
a common carrier duty.to provide service to high cost, low density rural areas
at equalized rates.2 50
The initial fallacy of this argument is the notion that deregulation would
provoke a wholesale evacuation of capital from less densely traveled traffic
lanes. Carriers who enter deregulated markets already receiving satisfac-
tory service at competitive prices would suppress prices to levels below their
costs. In the absence of the monopoly rate-setting encouraged by the
regulatory status quo, some carriers would be required to withdraw from
these markets and efficient price and service levels would be restored. 25 1
Regulation proponents also inaccurately assume that rural carrier ser-
vice is unable to support itself without a cross-subsidy from high density
routes. Not only do the facts resist this assertion, but nothing in the Missouri
Bus and Truck Law makes the provision of rural service a requirement of
entry into the motor carriage business. There is no incentive to provide rural
service under the present entry and rate control apparatus, yet rural Missouri
continues to receive service from the motor carrier industry.
A study by the Wyoming Public Service Commission, to determine the
extent to which certificated carriers met their common carrier obligation,
found that only half of the carriers authorized to provide service in eleven
predominantly small towns did so. 25 2 A related study of a nine-state Rocky
Mountain region found that the number of carriers actually providing ser-
vice was half the number authorized to do so. 253 The deficiency in service
implied by this finding was underscored by the results of a questionnaire
sent to shippers in Utah, Wyoming, and Idaho. Not only did fifty-five per-
cent of the respondents in rural areas rate motor carrier service unsatisfac-
tory, but the survey also showed that sixty-six percent of the respondents
used private carriage. 254
Similar findings were made in Kansas, where the Post-Audit Division
found that "many common carriers in Kansas do not serve small com-
250. Staff Paper, supra note 35, at 1318-21.
251. Id. at 1318.
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munities even though they have authority to do so." 25 5 Common carriers
account for fifty-four percent of rural shipping in Kansas; the remaining
needs are met by private (thirty percent) and contract 25 6 (sixteen percent)
carriers.
25 7
Finally, in June 1981, the I.C.C. issued its first report on the impact
of deregulation on service to small communities. 25 8 The report not only failed
to substantiate the claim that rural areas would be adversely affected by
deregulation, it actually found that changes resulting from deregulation had
usually improved service. 25 9 Neither economic theory nor the empirical data
supports the proposition that rural service is incapable of supporting itself
without motor carrier entry and rate regulation. Rather, the data suggests
that such controls contribute to inadequate rural service.
2 60
Even if there were some validity to the cross-subsidy argument, a system
designed to force urban shippers to pay part of the costs of rural shippers
is difficult to justify on equity grounds. In the unlikely event such subsidies
are necessary, more direct and precise means for achieving this goal are
available.2 61 There is simply no evidence that rate and entry control is an
effective method for accomplishing such a task.
262
255. Audit Report, supra note 207, at 16.
256. Id. at 59. In Missouri, contract carriage is subject to the same entry con-
trol mechanism as common carriage. See MO. REV. STAT. § 390.061 (1978).
257. The search for alternatives to common carriage is a consistent response
to the poor service, high rates, and lack of service options which characterize the
regulated common carrier sector. Snow, supra note 68, at 28.
258. Interstate Commerce Commission, Office of Policy and Analysis, Interim
Report: Small Community Service Study (June 1981).
259. Id. at I-1, 1-2.
260. See R. L. Banks & Associates, Service to Small Communities, in REGULATION
OF ENTRY AND PRICING IN TRUCK TRANSPORTATION 139 (P. MacAvoy andJ.
Snow ed. 1977); Staff Paper, supra note 35, at 1319.
261. Direct government subsidy would be a more precise and less wasteful
method of subsidizing rural service than reliance on entry and rate regulation. See
Snow, supra note 68, at 31.
262. A study of motor carriers in the northwest Rocky Mountain region found
that the federal motor carrier regulatory system is not important in maintaining
the viability of small rural communities. Two major findings led to this conclusion:
(1) Although the common carrier service obligations require carriers to
serve all points in their operating certificates, common carriers in the cur-
rent regulated environment are able to avoid serving small towns in isolated
areas if they consider such traffic to be unprofitable or less attractive than
traffic in their other markets, that is, the cross subsidization argument has
no empirical support. (2) Communities are being served by other types
of interstate carriers (UPS, private carriers, short-haul interstate carriers,
and bus package service) and when all the various types of carriers are con-
sidered, including those regular-route common carriers offering service,
the overall level of service is adequate to meet the needs of the communities.
Breen & Allen, Common Carrier Obligations and the Provision of Motor Carrier Service to
Small Rural Communities, Q. REV. ECON. & BUS., Winter 1980, at 86, 104.
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VIII. REMEDIES: DEREGULATION AND ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
Increasing consumer welfare requires elimination of Missouri's statutory
scheme for entry and rate regulation of intrastate motor carriage. In the long
run, this means repeal of the offending provisions. 263 Proponents of deregula-
tion, however, can anticipate stiff political resistance from those who derive
pecuniary benefit from the existing system. In the interim, it may be possi-
ble to attack some of the most pernicious consequences of rate and entry
regulation in the courts. The vehicle for this attack is the antitrust law.
One of the maxims of antitrust enforcement is that price-fixing
agreements among competitors are per se 264 violations of the antitrust laws.265
When firms band together to set single line rates collectively by way of rate
bureaus, they are engaging in horizontal price-fixing. 266
A. State Action Immunity
Assuming price-fixing by rate bureaus is attacked under federal antitrust
law, the defendants will likely assert that their activities are insulated under
the state action immunity doctrine promulgated by the United States
Supreme Court in Parker v. Brown.267 Prior to the mid-1970's, private par-
ties acting within the scope of state regulation confidently asserted this defense
against liability for anticompetitive acts. 268 In the aftermath of several
Supreme Court decisions beginning with Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,269 the
"state action" doctrine has become less useful to antitrust defendants. 270
In the recent case of California Retail Liquor Dealers Association v. Midcal
Aluminum, 27 1 the Supreme Court held that two standards must be met to suc-
cessfully interpose this defense: the restraint "must be 'one clearly articulated
and affirmatively expressed as state policy,' " and it "must be 'actively
supervised' by the State itself." 272
263. This would require repeal of the following provisions: MO. REV. STAT.
§5 387.030, .040, .050, .070, .100, .120, .130, .190; 390.041, .051, .061, .081, .091,
.101, .106,.111, .116,.121 (1978). Safety and insurance provisions would remain
intact under the proposed repeal.
264. See note 91 supra.
265. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223-24
(1940).
266. Sims, supra note 37, at 981.
267. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
268. See, e.g., Gas Light Co. v. Georgia Power Co., 440 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1062 (1972); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Lanier, 361 F.2d 870
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 930 (1966).
269. 421 U.S. 773 (1975). Goldfarb held that enforcement of a price-fixing
schedule by state and county bars did not benefit from the state action immunity
of Parker v. Brown because the activity was not compelled by the state. Id. at 792.
270. See, e.g., Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
271. 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
272. Id. at 105 (quotingCityofLafayettev. Louisiana Power& Light Co., 435
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An examination of the Missouri Bus and Truck Law discloses that
horizontal price-fixing by motor carrier rate bureaus is not insulated by state
action immunity under the Mideal Aluminum standard. Nowhere does the
Missouri statute permit horizontal price-fixing among competitors, or even
mention rate bureaus. The closest it comes to giving affirmative legal sanc-
tion to collective price activity is to allow the establishment of "reasonable
through routes and joint rates" pursuant to Missouri Revised Statutes sec-
tion 390.116.273 This section clearly deals with "rates covering a shipment
in which one carrier operates over only part of the route and another car-
rier serves the remainder.'"274 It does not require horizontal price agreements
by competitors but is merely a device enabling a shipper to obtain a single
price for a shipment involving more than one carrier.2 7 5 This hardly amounts
to a showing that collective rate-setting is a" 'clearly articulated... affir-
matively expressed' . . . state policy." 276 The failure of rate bureau price-
fixing activity to meet the threshold standard articulated in MidcalAluminum
vitiates the state action immunity defense for intrastate rate bureau activity.
This conclusion is strengthened by the decision in United States v. Southern
Motor Carriers Rate Conference.277 The case arose from an action brought by
the Justice Department to enjoin collective rate coordination and publica-
U.S. 389, 410 (1978)). In the course of articulating this two pronged test, the Court
further observed:
The California system for wine pricing satisfies the first standard. The
legislative policy is forthrightly stated and clear in its purpose to permit
resale price maintenance. The program, however, does not meet the sec-
ond requirement for Parker immunity. The state simply authorizes price-
setting and enforces the prices established by private parties. The state
neither establishes prices nor reviews the reasonableness of the price
schedules; nor does it regulate the terms of fair trade contracts. The state
does not monitor market conditions or engage in any "pointed re-
examinations" of the program. The national policy in favor of competi-
tion cannot be thwarted by casting such a gauzy cloak of state involvement
over what is essentially a private price-fixing arrangement. As Parker
teaches, "A state does not give immunity to those who violate the Sher-
man Act by authorizing them to violate it, or by declaring that their ac-
tion is lawful . .. ."
Id. at 105-06 (footnote omitted). See also City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power &
Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 410 (1978).
273. (1978).
274. 455 U.S. at 105. For a discussion of interlining, see notes 142-43 and ac-
companying text supra.
275. For a discussion of the meaning of an Alabama statutory interlining pro-
vision virtually identical to Mo. REV. STAT. § 390.116 (1978), see United States
v. Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, 467 F. Supp. 471, 474 (N.D. Ga.
1979), aff'd, 672 F.2d 469 (5th Cir. 1982).
276. Midcal, 445 U.S. at 105 (quoting New Motor Vehicle Board v. Orrin W.
Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96, 109 (1978)).
277. 672 F.2d 469 (5th Cir. 1982).
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tion by the defendants, who represented intrastate common carriers before
various state regulatory commissions. 278 The district court had rendered sum-
mary judgment in favor of the United States, holding that the defendants'
rate formulations violated section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. 279
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
characterized the issue as "whether a private party may avail itself of the
[state action] exception only if the state compels it to perform the disputed
actions.' '280 In the course of surveying pre-Midcal cases construing state action
immunity, 28 1 the court noted that "the Supreme Court has made clear that
private parties can invoke the state action exception only if the state com-
pels their actions.' '282 The court specifically rejected the argument that Midcal
eliminated any state compulsion prerequisite for private party invocation
of the exception:
First, there is not the slightest hint in Midcal that the Court no longer
agreed with its earlier holdings. To the contrary, the Court cited
those holdings with approval, even quoting Goldfarb's statement that
"[i]t is not enough that ... anticompetitive conduct is 'promoted'
by state action; rather, anticompetitive activities must be compelled
by direction of the state acting as sovereign.". . . Second, the
language the Court used to announce its standard, "clearly ar-
ticulated and affirmatively expressed state policy," does not imply
a departure from the compulsion requirement .... Moreover, in
the context of private parties, we cannot see how there ever could be a clearly
articulated and affirmativey expressed state policy in any case in which the state
allows an individual to choose at his whimsy the option of doing or not doing
some act.
283
Turning to the defendants' activities, the court found that the rate-making
activities were not compelled by the state and were therefore not exempt from
the antitrust laws. 284
B. The Noerr-Pennington Defense
One of the most fertile fields for anticompetitive predation is through
the abuse of administrative and judicial processes.28 5 A potential impedi-
ment to antitrust enforcement in this area is the argument that those who
use regulatory procedures for anticompetitive purposes are merely exercis-
278. The state regulatory commissions involved in this case were those of
Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi, North Carolina, and Tennessee.
279. United States v. Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, 467 F. Supp.
471 (N.D. Ga. 1979), aff'd, 672 F.2d 469 (5th Cir. 1982).
280. 672 F.2d at 472.
281. See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Goldfarb v.
Virginia State Bar Ass'n, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
282. 672 F.2d at 472.
283. Id. at 474-75.
284. Id. at 476.
285. R. BORK, supra note 51, at 347-48.
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ing first amendment rights to petition and influence government. 28 6 Pro-
ponents of this defense rely on Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr
Motor Freight287 and United Mine Workers v. Pennington28 for the general pro-
position that attempts to influence government are immunized from antitrust
liability.
Although the Noerr-Pennington doctrine does, in fact, shield much con-
certed activity directed toward government bodies from legal assault, 289 it
does not afford complete immunity. In California Motor Transport Co. v. Truck-
ing Unlimited,290 the plaintiffs were small carriers operating within Califor-
nia. Their complaint alleged that the defendants, some of the largest truck-
ing firms in the state, had conspired to weaken or destroy the plaintiffs' com-
peting trucking businesses. The alleged vehicle for this conspiracy was ajoint
trust fund established to finance opposition to applications for operating rights
before state and federal agencies and the courts. 291 In an opinion by Justice
Douglas, the United States Supreme Court held that the first amendment
did not immunize from antitrust scrutiny the use of administrative and
judicial proceedings for anticompetitive purposes. Where the defendant's
activities are " 'a mere sham to cover what is actually nothing more than
an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a
competitor,' "292 antitrust liability can result.
The most direct treatment of an attempt by motor carrier rate bureaus
to assert the Noerr-Pennington doctrine as a defense to collective rate-fixing
is found in Southern Motor Carriers, discussed in the previous section. In add-
ition to rejecting the state action defense, the Fifth Circuit agreed with the
district court that collective rate formulation was "outside the scope of First
Amendment protection or the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.' '293 The court
distinguished between agreements to seek legislation, protected under the
doctrine, and agreements that are nothing more than horizontal
price-fixing. 294 While the case law is not extensive, Southern Motor Carriers
is consistent with other authority holding that Noerr-Pennington will not im-
munize price-fixing conferences as a preliminary to petitioning government
agencies. 295 The argument that collective rate-making comes under the rubric
286. Id. at 349.
287. 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
288. 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
289. See, e.g., Missouri v. National Org. for Women, 620 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 842 (1980).
290. 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
291. This theory is explained in detail in the lower court decision. Trucking
Unlimited v. California Motor Transport Co., 432 F.2d 755 (9th Cir. 1970), aff'd,
404 U.S. 508 (1972).
292. 404 U.S. at 511 (quoting Noerr, 365 U.S. at 144).
293. 672 F.2d at 477.
294. Id.
295. See United States v. Northern Cal. Pharmaceutical Ass'n, 235 F. Supp.
378, 381 (N.D. Cal. 1964).
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of the first amendment right to petition is further undermined when we recall
that nowhere in the Missouri statutory motor carrier regime is this activity
recognized as a legitimate or necessary aspect of rate regulation.
Although horizontal price-fixing by rate bureaus is the practice most
vulnerable to antitrust attack, the most insidious behavior from a consumer
welfare perspective may be the anticompetitive exploitation of the entry con-
trols in Missouri Revised Statutes section 390.051.296 We have already seen
how administrative processes are used as instruments of cartel enforcement.
The temptation must be great for incumbent motor carriers to make con-
certed use of the certification process in order to bar new competition. This
type of activity is more similar to the type of conduct protected by Noerr-
Penninglon. The question is to what extent the use of administrative machinery
will create antitrust liability.
One of the most intriguing decisions on the subject is the recent opin-
ion in Clipper Exxpress v. Rocky Mountain Motor Tariff.297 In late 1970, Clip-
per, a freight forwarder, 298 submitted a tariff to the I.C.C. that it believed
would be low enough to enable it to compete with unregulated shipper
associations and shipper agents. 299 The Rocky Mountain Motor Tariff
Bureau filed a protest to the tariff with the I.C.C., which investigated the
rate for two years but did not suspend it. During the course of the investiga-
tion, Clipper filed a number of amendments lowering the rate and extend-
ing its geographic coverage. Although the I.C.C. consistently found in favor
of Clipper throughout the investigation, the Tariff Bureau and competing
carriers exhausted every administrative procedure in their effort to block
the tariff.3°0
296. (1978). To the extent the entry control process successfully bars new com-
petition, incentives for cost control are reduced. The political visibility of profit rates
tends to consume much time and energy of regulatory bodies in their determina-
tion of what constitutes a reasonable rate of return. Insufficient attention is paid
to the absence of incentives to minimize costs when competition is suppressed-
and costs make up a much greater fraction of the price of most goods and services
than does profit. Thus, a small inefficiency can increase the price of a good much
more than would a major increase in the profit rate. Thomas Sowell observes:
Regulated firms whose explicit financial profit rate is restricted have
every incentive to allow costs to rise, taking various benefits in
nonpecuniary forms, such as fringe benefits (especially for management),
more relaxed (inefficient) management, less innovative activity and the
headaches it brings, less unpleasantness such as firing people or hiring
associates who are offensive in manner, race or sex. In addition, the more
costs the regulated firm can accumulate-and get the regulatory agency
to accept as valid-the higher its total profits at a given rate of profit.
T. SOWELL, KNOWLEDGE AND DECISIONS 198 (1980) (footnotes omitted).
297. 674 F.2d 1252 (9th Cir. 1982).
298. Freight forwarders are operators who ship no goods themselves, but who
assemble and consolidate small shipments into single lots for shipment by other car-
rier companies.
299. 674 F.2d at 1257.
300. Id. 46
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In 1972, Clipper filed an antitrust suit, alleging (1) the defendants' pro-
tests were shams designed to restrict, lessen, and prohibit competition from
freight forwarders; (2) the defendants attempted fraudulently to influence
the I.C.C. to gain a competitive advantage; and (3) the protests were part
of a larger independent antitrust violation. 301 The district court granted sum-
maryjudgment for the defendants, partly'on the ground that Noerr-Pennington
immunized their activities from antitrust liability.302
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed,
holding that for purposes of summary judgment Clipper had made a suffi-
cient factual showing that the protests were spurious and "prosecuted without
regard to their merit.' '303 The most interesting part of the opinion was the
court's discussion of the use of administrative protests to further a larger
conspiracy to fix rates. The court observed that the defendants had engag-
ed in the practice of refraining from offering lower rates to each other's
customers, and that this was enforced, if necessary, "by vigorous protests
against competitive rate publications.' '30 The defendants claimed that these
activities were shielded by Noerr-Pennington, regardless of whether they fur-
thered an independent antitrust violation.30 5 In rejecting that argument, the
court, relying on Trucking Unlimited,30 6 held that when there is a conspiracy
prohibited by the antitrust laws, general antitrust principles apply where
"otherwise legal litigation ... is but a part of a larger overall scheme to
restrain trade.' '307 Applying that principle to the facts, the court stated:
No one has contended that the alleged price-fix conspiracy was
intended to influence governmental actions. The defendants' actions
do not enjoy immunity, even though a part of the actions may have
involved protected first amendment petitioning. The reach of the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine is not that extensive and the antitrust
laws are not that impotent.3 0 8
Clipper Exxpress is a potentially valuable addition to the arsenal of an-
titrust challenges to anticompetitive conduct in the motor carrier industry.
As we have seen, abuse of the certification process is crucial to cartel en-
forcement. Cases like Clipper Exxpress limit the zone of immunity from which
incumbent carriers can mount collusive assaults on consumer welfare.
C. State Antitrust Immunity
In 1974, the Missouri General Assembly enacted the Missouri Anti-
Trust Act, 30 9 in part because the old law did not prohibit restraints of trade
301. Id. at 1258.
302. Id. at 1256.
303. Id. at 1264.
304. Id. at 1273.
305. Id. at 1258.
306. Trucking Unlimited v. California Motor Transport Co., 404 U.S. 508
(1972).
307. 674 F.2d at 1273.
308. Id. at 1279.
309. Mo. REV. STAT. § 416.011-.161 (1978).
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occurring in connection with service activities. 3 10 As the Missouri Supreme
Court has observed:
The Act closely parallels provisions of the Sherman and Clayton
Acts of federal antitrust law. Section 416.031.1 of the Act makes
unlawful every contract, combination or conspiracy in restraint of
trade or commerce, conduct which is prohibited by § 1 of the Sher-
man Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). Section 416.031.2 of the Act makes
unlawful monopolization, attempted monopolization, and con-
spiracy to monopolize trade or commerce, conduct which is pro-
hibited by § 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).311
In order to provide a "ready body of precedent for interpreting the law and
a single standard of business conduct" for Missouri businesses, Missouri
Revised Statutes section 416.141312 directs that it "shall be construed in har-
mony with ruling judicial interpretation of comparable federal antitrust
statutes.' '313
In Georgia v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co. ,314 the United States Supreme Court
held that I.C.C. regulation of railroads did not immunize horizontal price-
fixing by rate bureaus. 3 15 In response to this decision, prompted by vigorous
lobbying by surface transportation interests, Congress passed the Reed-
Bullwinkle Act 316 over presidential veto 317 in 1948. This law conferred ex-
press statutory immunity on the collective price-setting activities of rate
bureaus31 8 and, as President Truman feared, enshrined into law a sustained
assault on consumer welfare. 31 9
Although the Missouri Bus and Truck Law provides no express statutory
immunity for horizontal price-fixing by rate bureaus, an antitrust defen-
dant sued under state law may argue that immunity is conferred under
Missouri Revised Statutes section 416.041.2,320 which provides that nothing
in the law "shall be construed to apply to activities or arrangements expressly
310. See Ashcroft, supra note 215, at 473.
311. Fischer v. Forrest T. Jones & Co., 586 S.W.2d 310, 312 (Mo. En Banc
1979).
312. (1978). See also Almstedt & Tyler, State Antitrust Laws: New Directions in
Missouri, 39 MO. L. REV. 489 (1974).
313. Mo. REV. STAT. § 416.141 (1978).
314. 324 U.S. 439 (1945).
315. Id. at 461.
316. Ch. 491, 62 Stat. 472 (1948) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 56 (1976)).
317. See President Truman's veto message in 1948 PUB. PAPERS 330-32.
318. 49 U.S.C. § 10706 (Supp.IV 1980) terminates this immunity for interstate
motor carriers on January 1, 1984.
319. Recent case law suggests ajudicial willingness to impose significant limits
on the extent to which collective price activity in the surface transportation industries
is shielded by the Reed-Bullwinkle Act. See United States v. Baltimore & O.R.R.,
538 F. Supp. 200 (D.D.C. 1982) (Reed-Bullwinkle neither authorizes I.C.C. to





Missouri Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 4 [1982], Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol47/iss4/4
MOTOR CARRIER DEREGULATION
approved or regulated by any regulatory body or officer acting under
statutory authority of this state or of the United States." The validity of this
argument is doubtful. In the single Missouri state decision 321 construing sec-
tion 416.041.2, the plaintiffs were insurance brokers who alleged that the
defendant had engaged in various anticompetitive activities in violation of
the Missouri Anti-Trust Act.3 22 The trial court dismissed the action, holding
in part that all activities of the insurance industry were exempt from Missouri
antitrust law under section 416.041.2.323 The Missouri Supreme Court
characterized the principal issue as "whether the provision is a codification
of the 'state action' doctrine of federal antitrust law . . . or whether, as
respondents contend, this provision exempts the insurance industry because
its activities are regulated by state law.' '324
The court cited the United States Supreme Court's view that implied
immunity from the antitrust laws is not favored and" 'can be justified only
by a convincing showing of clear repugnancy between the antitrust laws and
the regulatory system.' "325 Nowhere, said the court, is there an express ex-
emption for regulated industries.3 26 Applying the high Court's Goldfarb-Cantor
test, 327 the Missouri Supreme Court found that the defendant's activity was
neither required by the state nor impliedly exempted:
Nor does this case involve "activities or arrangements expressly ap-
proved" by the state. Nor is the alleged anticompetitive activity even
arguably insulated on the ground that it is in compliance with state
statutes regulating the insurance industry. ... Under the "state ac-
tion" exemption, anticompetitive activities are exempt if they are
compelled by state regulations. The "state action" doctrine does
not relieve antitrust liability for anticompetitive conduct which also
violates state regulations for particular industries. This is not a case
where an implied exemption from the Act is necessary "in order to
make the regulatory act work" under the "state action" doctrine
as articulated in Cantor.328
The Missouri motor carrier scheme contains no affirmative statutory or
321. Fischer v. Forrest T. Jones & Co., 586 S.W.2d 310 (Mo. En Banc 1979).
322. Id. at 312. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant had entered into
agreements with the Missouri State Teachers Association to deprive the plaintiffs
of necessary statistical data and to provide them with false and incomplete data.
The petition also alleged that the defendant entered into agreements with school
districts under which the districts could obtain group accident and health insurance
only if they also purchased group life insurance. Id.
323. Id. at 311.
324. Id. at 313.
325. Id. (quoting United States v. National Ass'n of Securities Dealers, 422
U.S. 694, 719-20 (1975)).
326. 586 S.W.2d at 313. Seegenerally Comment, TheMissouri "StateAction " Anti-
trust Exemption, 45 UMKC L. REV. 257 (1976).
327. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976); Goldfarb v. Virginia
State Bar Ass'n, 421 U.S. 773 (1975). See text accompanying notes 267-72 supra.
328. 586 S.W.2d at 314.
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regulatory sanction of horizontal rate agreements between competing
carriers. 329 The decisional authority and commentary33° establishes that mere
acquiescence by regulatory bodies to anticompetitive practices will not pro-
vide antitrust immunity for rate bureau activities. At least one recent deci-
sion from a sister state has also refused to recognize implied or state action
immunity for rate bureau price-fixing. 33
1
The Missouri Bus and Truck Law declares that it "is enacted for the
sole purpose of promoting and conserving the interests and convenience of
the public.' '332 This purpose cannot be served by tolerating horizontal price
fixing by motor carrier rate bureaus. Although statutory repeal is an essen-
tial long term solution to the anticompetitive consequences of entry and rate
regulation, antitrust enforcement would be a useful first step toward vin-
dicating consumer welfare. 333
IX. CONCLUSION
This Article has taken the position that entry and rate regulation of
Missouri's intrastate motor carrier industry serves none of the policy con-
siderations that arguably support government regulation of natural
monopolies. Where the activities of rate bureaus and their members amount
to horizontal price-fixing, they violate the antitrust laws. One need not be
persuaded of the universal validity of the producer-protection hypothesis
of government regulation to conclude that the case for condemning such rate-
setting is compelling.
We have also seen how entry control facilitates cartelization of the motor
carrier industry and reduces the competitive discipline which encourages
efficient low cost service. In addition to the absence of creditable theoretical
support for motor carrier entry and rate control as a means of maximizing
consumer welfare, the recent empirical literature casts serious doubt on the
ability of this kind of direct marketplace intervention to ever yield accept-
able results. 334 Unless we are prepared to redefine consumer welfare so as
329. See Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 390.011-.240 (1978).
330. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 326, at 286.
331. See State v. Wisconsin Motor Carriers Ass'n, 1980-81 Trade Cas. (CCH)
63,739 (Dane County Cir. Ct. 1981).
332. Mo. REV. STAT. § 390.011 (1978).
333. Although state antitrust enforcement has attractive aspects, see, e.g., the
parens patriae provisions of 15 U.S.C. § 15c (Supp.V 1981), certain factors make
the likelihood of such action problematical. Given adequate resources and political
incentives, state attorneys general may be willing to test the frontiers of antitrust,
particularly if the target defendant is a prominent out-of-state enterprise. However,
when state enforcement confronts politically potent in-state interests such as motor
carrier associations, the enthusiasm for attacking even the clearest anticompetitive
activity is likely to wane. See R. BORK, supra note 51, at 406. Cf Ashcroft, supra note
215, at 507-13 (detailing Missouri enforcement actions).
334. Some who concede the producer-protection consequences of rate regula-
tion may nevertheless be tempted to seek a solution that somehow preserves the
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to legitimize economic inefficiency and the collection of monopoly profits
by certificated carriers and their allies, 33 5 retention of Missouri's motor carrier
entry and rate-making system is unsupported by any defensible conception
of the public interest.
rate control function of the P.S.C. in the motor carrier context. Well-meaning pro-
ponents of reform may thus suggest that the solution lies in appointing regulatory
personnel who are properly trained and committed to efficiency-enhancing
consumer-oriented rate-making policies. The legislature should reject this pristine
delusion.
One of the more persistent themes in the literature of public utility regulation
is the determination of the correct price level for monopoly industries. The con-
ventional approach attempts to ascertain the appropriate rate level for the regulated
enterprise based on "cost of service." The efficacy of this type of rate-making is
questionable even in the "natural monopoly" context. When applied to com-
petitively structured industries, this methodology is almost certain to yield ineffi-
cient results because it cannot adequately predict the price needed to attract capital
investment, the elasticity of demand in a competitive market, changes in costs, or
changes in efficiency. These problems are exacerbated by the need to make rules
which are administratively practical. In studying the problems, Stephen Breyer,
now ajudge on the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, has drawn
two conclusions:
First, attempts to obtain economic precision in the regulatory process are
unlikely to be worth the effort expended. Second, insofar as one advocates
price regulation (or cost-of-service ratemaking) as a "cure" for market
failure, one must believe the market is working very badly before ad-
vocating regulation as a cure. Given the inability of regulation to reproduce
the competitive market's price signals, only severe market failure would
make the regulatory game worth the candle.
Breyer, supra note 239, at 565. See alsoJones, Government Price Controls and Inflation:
A Prognosis Based on the Impact of Controls in the Regulated Industries, 65 CORNELL L.
REV. 303 (1980).
335. Political resistance to dismantlement of Missouri's motor carrier cartel
enforcement scheme will not be limited to the motor carrier lobby. Several law firms
in this state, who represent parties in the certification process, have a strong
pecuniary interest in retaining the regulatory status quo. To the extent that intrastate
carriers are unionized, deregulation will also be opposed by labor unions since freer
entry could make organizing more difficult and labor could no longer bargain for
a share of monopoly profits eliminated under competition. The railroads may also
oppose deregulation out of fear that lower prices will divert traffic from rail to motor
carrier modes. For a discussion ofjust who gets a piece of the regulatory pie, see
Moore, The Beneficiaries of Trucking Regulation, 21 J.L. & EGON. 327 (1978).
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